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Ascertainability: Prose, Policy, and Process
RHONDA WASSERMAN
One of the most hotly contested issues in class action practice today is
ascertainability—when and how the identities of individual class members must be
ascertained. The courts of appeals are split on the issue, with courts in different
circuits imposing dramatically different burdens on putative class representatives.
Courts adopting a strict approach require the class representative to prove that
there is an administratively feasible means of determining whether class members
are part of the class. This burden may be insurmountable in consumer class actions
because people tend not to save receipts for purchases of low-cost consumer goods,
like soft drinks and snacks, and have no other objective proof of their membership
in the class. Thus, in circuits adopting the strict approach, class certification may
be denied, whereas in other circuits, the same class may be certified.
Notwithstanding the circuit split on this critical issue, the Supreme Court has denied
several petitions for writs of certiorari raising the issue; the Senate has failed to act
on a bill passed by the House to address it; and the Advisory Committee has placed
the issue on hold. Given the current state of disuniformity and the resultant
inequitable administration of the laws, the time is ripe to address the issue.
Ascertainability is not only of great practical importance, but it is interesting
on three different levels. First, there is a question of
prose: whether the text of the Rule supports the implication of the strict
ascertainability requirement. Second, there is a question of policy: whether concern
for the class action defendant, the absent class members, or the trial court
overseeing the action justifies imposition of the strict requirement, notwithstanding
its harsh impact on consumer class actions. Third, there is a process question:
which governmental actor—the lower courts, the Supreme Court, the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, or Congress—has the greatest institutional competency
to resolve the policy issue and establish a uniform approach to ascertainability. This
Article addresses each of these questions in turn.

695

ARTICLE CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................697
I.

PROSE: THE TEXT OF RULE 23 .......................................................701
A.
B.

TEXTUAL CLUES THAT SUPPORT THE TRADITIONAL
APPROACH TO ASCERTAINABILITY .................................................702
TEXTUAL CLUES THAT UNDERMINE THE STRICT
APPROACH TO ASCERTAINABILITY .................................................703

II. POLICY: THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE TRADITIONAL AND
STRICT APPROACHES TO ASCERTAINABILITY .........................704
A.
B.
C.

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH ........................................................705
THE STRICT APPROACH...................................................................712
POLICIES UNDERLYING THE TRADITIONAL
AND STRICT APPROACHES TO ASCERTAINABILITY ..........................718

III. PROCESS: INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCIES ..............................731
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ..................................................731
THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS .......................................................738
CONGRESS.......................................................................................744
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ........................................754
TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ..............................................................760

Ascertainability: Prose, Policy, and Process
RHONDA WASSERMAN *
INTRODUCTION
One of the most hotly contested issues in class action practice today is
ascertainability—when and how the identities of individual class members
must be ascertained. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
governs class action practice in federal court, does not explicitly impose an
ascertainability requirement.1 Nevertheless, federal courts have long
required the plaintiff to demonstrate that a class exists2 and some have
required that it be “definite,” “ascertainable,”3 or “sufficiently
identifiable . . . .”4
A split has emerged among the lower federal courts regarding the nature
of, and policies underlying, this ascertainability requirement. The
traditional approach, espoused by the Second,5 Seventh,6 and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals,7 requires only a precise class definition and

*

Professor of Law and John E. Murray Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh School of Law;
Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School (fall 2016). I would like to thank Ashley Blakeney (Pitt
Law 2018) and Sarah McIntosh (Harvard Law LL.M. 2017) for their excellent research assistance. I
dedicate this article with much love and great pride to my youngest son, Benjamin Wasserman Stern, on
the occasion of his graduation from Johns Hopkins University and his selection as a Coro Fellow.
1
FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see infra Part I (noting the absence of an express ascertainability requirement
in the text of Rule 23); see also 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:2
(5th ed. 2011 & Dec. 2017 Supp.) (“As a prerequisite to class certification, some courts require that
plaintiffs propose a class that is ‘definite’ or ‘ascertainable.’ Because definiteness does not appear as one
of the required certification elements in Rule 23(a) or (b), it is considered an ‘implicit’ requirement for
class certification.”).
2
Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27, 31 (D.D.C. 2003); White v. Williams, 208 F.R.D.
123, 129 (D.N.J. 2002).
3
1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:1.
4
White, 208 F.R.D. at 129.
5
In re Petrobras Secs., 862 F.3d 250, 264–66 (2d Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed sub. nom
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. v. Universities Superannuation Scheme Ltd. (U.S. Nov. 1, 2017) (17-664); cf.
Leyse v. Lifetime Entm’t Servs., LLC, 679 Fed. App’x 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding there was no abuse
of discretion in finding that Leyse did not present a reliable method for proving class membership);
Brecher v. Rep. of Argentina, 806 F.3d 22, 24–25 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that objective criteria
can define an ascertainable class, but objective criteria alone cannot determine ascertainability when they
do not “establish the definite boundaries of a readily identifiable class”).
6
Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016).
7
Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313
(2017); accord Bruton v. Gerber Prods. Co., 703 Fed. App’x 468 (9th Cir. 2017); cf. Berger v. Home
Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1071 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014) (declining to address ascertainability).
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objective criteria for determining membership in the class. The strict
approach, adopted by the Third9 and Eleventh Circuits,10 imposes an
additional requirement—an “administratively feasible” method of
determining whether putative class members are part of the class and an
opportunity for the defendant to challenge the evidence offered to establish
class membership.11 While acknowledging the potential utility of purchase
records or databases to prove class membership,12 courts applying the strict
approach express deep skepticism about using affidavits to prove class
membership or other methods that rely on potential class members’ “say
so.”13 Since people rarely retain receipts for low-value purchases such as
over-the-counter medications or food products (if they even receive them),14

8

See infra Part II.A. In an excellent Note in the Yale Law Journal, Geoffrey Shaw uses the phrase
“minimally clear definition” to capture the “conceptual discreteness” required in defining a class; his
term “does not speak to the practical difficulties involved in identifying class members or to the
distinction between ‘objectively’ and ‘subjectively’ defined classes.” Geoffrey C. Shaw, Note, Class
Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2364 (2015); see also Robert G. Bone, Justifying Class Action
Limits: Parsing the Debates Over Ascertainability and Cy Pres, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 913, 914 (2017)
[hereinafter Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits] (explaining that “the traditional version of
ascertainability . . . demands only that the boundaries of the class be reasonably clear” (footnote
omitted)).
9
City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 439–41 (3d Cir. 2017);
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306–08 (3d Cir. 2013); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687
F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012).
10
Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 Fed. App’x 945, 947–48, 948 n.3, 950 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2015);
Bussey v. Macon Cty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 Fed. App’x 782, 787–88 (11th Cir. 2014); Little v. TMobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012); cf. Ward v. EZCorp, Inc., 679 Fed. App’x 987,
987 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). A recent decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals suggests that
it, too, may favor the strict approach. See Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. ASD Specialty Healthcare,
Inc., 863 F.3d 460, 466, 473 (6th Cir. 2017) (affirming denial of class certification where class members
would have had to submit individual affidavits to establish class membership years after the challenged
conduct); see also EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358–59 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Third Circuit
ascertainability case law); cf. Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015)
(declining to follow Carrera).
11
See infra Part II.B (describing the strict approach to ascertainability); see also, e.g., Karhu, 621
Fed. App’x at 948 (requiring plaintiff to “propose an administratively feasible method by which class
members can be identified” and noting that “[a] plaintiff proposing ascertainment via self-identification”
must avoid depriving defendants of “the opportunity to challenge class membership”); Carrera, 727 F.3d
at 308 (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate that the “purported method for ascertaining class members is
reliable and administratively feasible, and permits a defendant to challenge the evidence used to prove
class membership”).
12
See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 308 (“Depending on the facts of a case, retailer records may be a
perfectly acceptable method of proving class membership.”).
13
Id. at 306; Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013); Marcus, 687 F.3d
at 594; see Karhu, 621 Fed. App’x at 948 (describing the problems that may arise when individuals
present uncorroborated claims that they belong to a class or used a product).
14
In many cases, such as purchases from vending machines, consumers do not even have the option
of receiving a receipt. See, e.g., Karhu, 621 Fed. App’x at 954 (Martin, J., concurring) (discussing
purchases of chewing gum, bottled soft drinks, and cigarettes from vending machines).
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the strict approach to ascertainability threatens the viability of consumer
class actions.15
The Third Circuit, which has advanced the strict approach most
forcefully, argues that it is necessary to protect the interests of three different
actors in class action litigation. First, the Third Circuit claims that the strict
approach shields trial court judges from the otherwise laborious task of
determining whether individuals qualify as class members.16 Second,
according to the court, the strict ascertainability requirement protects the due
process rights of would-be class members by facilitating notice, which
enables them to exercise their right to opt out of the class action and, if they
prefer, to sue the defendant in independent actions.17 The Third Circuit
further maintains that the strict approach protects absent class members’
property interests by ensuring that their claims to a portion of the recovery
are not diluted by fraudulent or inaccurate claims by others who lack
objective proof of class membership or a right to recover.18 Third, the court
posits that the strict approach protects defendants by enabling them to
challenge absentees’ proof of class membership19 and to identify those who
are precluded by a final judgment in the defendant’s favor.20
The principal controversy, then, is whether these policies justify the
strict approach to ascertainability and its potentially devastating impact on
consumer class actions. This substantive policy question has provoked a

15

See, e.g., City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 443 (3d Cir.
2017) (Fuentes, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the ascertainability requirement imposes a burden on
consumer class actions); Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding
that the ascertainability requirement disrupts the balance “that district courts must strike when deciding
whether to certify classes”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016); Rule 23 Subcomm. Report, at 31, in
AGENDA BOOK FOR NOV. 5–6, 2015, MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES [hereinafter
NOV. 2015 AGENDA BOOK], at 117, tab 6A, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agendabooks/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-november-2015
[https://perma.cc/FM2B-JJUU]
(stating that “the most significant category of cases involving ascertainability problems are consumer
class actions involving low-value products”).
16
See infra Part II.C.1 (identifying efficiency and administrative convenience as policies served by
the ascertainability requirement); see also, e.g., Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593 (holding that one benefit of the
ascertainability requirement is efficiency and the easy identification of class members).
17
See infra Part II.C.2 (identifying protection of absent class members as a policy purportedly
served by the ascertainability requirement); see also, e.g., Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593 (noting that the
ascertainability requirement “protects absent class members by facilitating the ‘best notice practicable’”).
18
See infra Part II.C.2; see also, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013)
(detailing the harm to class members from fraudulent or inaccurate claims).
19
See infra Part II.C.3 (noting that courts adopting the strict approach invoke the need to protect
defendants); see also, e.g., Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307 (holding that a defendant is protected by due process
and can challenge a plaintiff’s claim to class membership).
20
See infra Part II.C.3; see also, e.g., Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593 (holding that the ascertainability
requirement protects defendants by identifying the individuals who will be bound by the final judgment).
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vigorous debate among the lower federal courts, academics, and the
practicing bar,23 and will be the focus of Part II of this article.
A related question that has received far less attention is the identity and
institutional role of the actor that should resolve this normative policy
question. At least since July 2015, when the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the Third Circuit’s strict approach to ascertainability,24 the
21
The United States Courts of Appeals divided on this issue. Compare, e.g., Carrera, 727 F.3d at
301, with Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2015) (the Carrera court held that
class cannot be ascertained through retailer records or affidavits of class members, while the Mullins
court held that there is no heightened ascertainability requirement). There are also disagreements among
individual judges on the same appellate court. Compare, e.g., City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank
of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2017), with id. at 448–49 (Fuentes, C.J., concurring) (the
majority imposed the strict ascertainability requirement, but Chief Judge Fuentes argued that the court
should reject it). Compare Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2015), with id. at 172
(Rendell, C.J., concurring). Accord Shaw, supra note 8, at 2360–61 (describing splits among judges on
the same court).
22
See, e.g., Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 8 (explaining that “the traditional
version of ascertainability . . . demands only that the boundaries of the class be reasonably clear”); Erin
L. Geller, The Fail-Safe Class as an Independent Bar to Class Certification, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769,
2771 (2013) (arguing that the “fail-safe classes independently bar class certification due to their failure
to satisfy the ascertainability requirement”); Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial
Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 307–08 (2010) (analyzing
class certification and its barriers); Stephanie Haas, Class Is in Session: The Third Circuit Heightens
Ascertainability with Rigor in Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 59 VILL. L. REV. 793, 795 (2014) (discussing the
declining practicability of class actions since the decision of Carrera); Daniel Luks, Ascertainability in
the Third Circuit: Name That Class Member, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2359 (2014) (describing the
Third Circuit’s imposition of a heightened ascertainability requirement); Tom Murphy, Implied Class
Warfare: Why Rule 23 Needs an Explicit Ascertainability Requirement in the Wake of Byrd v. Aaron’s
Inc., 57 B.C. L. REV. 34, 34 (2016) (arguing that Rule 23 needs to be amended to specifically include
ascertainability as a requirement); Shaw, supra note 8, at 2388 (arguing that the ascertainability
requirement frustrates the purpose of Rule 23).
23
See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Class Abides: Class Actions and the “Roberts Court,” 48 AKRON
L. REV. 757, 758, 761 (2015) (discussing the Court’s “indifference to the structural constraints of Rule
23”); Perry Cooper, Did the 8th Cir. Create Yet Another Class Member Test?, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP.
(BNA) (May 13, 2016) (describing the circuit split on the ascertainability requirement); Perry Cooper,
Split Emerges on Class Ascertainability, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) (Aug. 14, 2015) (describing
the circuit split on class ascertainability); Jamie Zysk Isani & Jason B. Sherry, Trends in Recent Class
Action Ascertainability Decisions, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) (Oct. 23, 2015) (summarizing the
four policy concerns that motivated the heightened ascertainability standard); Edward Soto & Erica W.
Rutner, Circuit Split on Ascertainability Leads to Inconsistency and Uncertainty in the Certification of
Class Actions, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) (April 8, 2016) (describing how the circuit split resulted
in uncertainty and inconsistency in the certification of class actions).
24
Compare Mullins, 795 F.3d at 655, with Carrera, 727 F.3d at 301 (the Third Circuit held that a
strict ascertainability standard should apply, but the Seventh Circuit rejected it and held that the federal
rules do not impose a heightened ascertainability requirement). Arguably, the circuit split developed
slightly earlier. In In re Nexium Antitrust Litigation, 777 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015), the First Circuit Court of
Appeals cited the Third Circuit’s ascertainability test, but concluded that affidavits by class members
“would be sufficient” to exclude from the class those purchasers who had suffered no injury. Id. at 20.
The majority purported to distinguish the Third Circuit precedents that had rejected affidavits by
distinguishing “affidavits concerning the past purchase of the product in question (necessary for class
membership), [from] affidavits concerning likely future purchases . . . as to which documents are not
available.” Id. at 20 n.17 (citations omitted).
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federal courts of appeals have been divided on the proper approach to
ascertainability. Although the United States Supreme Court often accepts
cases for review when a circuit split develops,25 the Court has denied
petitions for writs of certiorari in at least four recent cases addressing
ascertainability.26 The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which plays a
central role in the promulgation and amendment of the Rules, has taken note
of the circuit split on ascertainability, but it, too, has declined to act.27 And
while the House of Representatives has adopted the strict approach to
ascertainability in the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act,28 the bill has
stalled in the Senate.29 Thus, the only governmental actors to take up the
ascertainability issue have been the lower federal courts.
While leaving resolution of the substantive policy question to the lower
federal courts has certain advantages, it undermines uniformity in the
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure30 and denies practicing
attorneys and the broader public a voice in the resolution of this important
policy issue. Thus, in addition to the principal policy question raised by
ascertainability, there is an important and interesting process question: by
what process and by which institutional actor should the substantive policy
issue underlying ascertainability be resolved. Part III of this article addresses
this process question.
Before addressing these pressing policy and process questions, however,
in Part I we turn to a question of prose: whether the text or structure of Rule
23 supports an ascertainability requirement of any stripe.
I.

PROSE: THE TEXT OF RULE 23

Rule 23(a) expressly requires that all class actions satisfy four
prerequisites referred to colloquially as numerosity, commonality,
25
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the Supreme Court’s process in reviewing petitions for writs of
certiorari).
26
ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. Briseno, 138 S. Ct. 313, 313 (2017); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Rikos,
136 S. Ct. 1493, 1493 (2016); Direct Dig., Inc. v. Mullins, 136 S. Ct. 1161, 1162 (2016); Martin v. Pac.
Parking Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 962, 962 (2015).
27
See infra Part III.D.2 (describing the Advisory Committee’s consideration of the ascertainability
requirement).
28
H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017) (passed the House on Mar. 9, 2017 by a vote of 220 to 201).
29
S. 1777, 115th Cong. (2017) (received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary on Mar. 13, 2017); see also infra Part III.C.3 (noting that the Senate has not taken up the
Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017). Professors Coffee and Lahav conclude that the
“legislation has gone nowhere in the Senate, and . . . it seems unlikely to pass.” John C. Coffee, Jr. &
Alexandra D. Lahav, Class Actions in the Era of Trump: Trends and Developments in Class Certification
and Related Issues, 2017 ABA NAT’L INST. ON CLASS ACTIONS 3, https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3037564 [https://perma.cc/YU2V-WCAJ].
30
See David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 949 (citing uniformity as a value that “counsels in favor of
interpretation over discretion in the lower federal courts” and “[i]nterpretive restraint”).

702

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:3

31

typicality, and adequacy of representation. Rule 23(b) further requires that
a class conform to one of the types identified in that subsection.32 Courts and
scholars have long conceded that the text of Rule 23 does not specifically
mention ascertainability.33 While some lower federal courts have “implied”
an ascertainability requirement from the text of the Rule34 or consider it an
“implicit”35 or “inherent”36 requirement, the language and structure of the
Rule are inconsistent with the strict approach to ascertainability.37
A. Textual Clues that Support the Traditional Approach to Ascertainability
Courts have cited two textual clues to support the traditional
ascertainability requirement. First, courts have relied upon Rule 23(a)’s use
of the word “class,”38 noting that “[c]lass certification presupposes the
existence of an actual ‘class.’”39 Unless the court can define the class and
ascertain its members, it will be unable to determine whether Rule 23(a)’s
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation are satisfied.40 Thus, as the Third Circuit put it,

31

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
33
See, e.g., Torres v. Mercer Canyons, Inc., 305 F.R.D. 646, 651 (E.D. Wash. 2015) (conceding
there is no express ascertainability requirement in Rule 23); Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. C 1201633 CRB, 2014 WL 2702726, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014) (same); Grimes v. Rave Motion Pictures
Birmingham, L.L.C., 264 F.R.D. 659, 663 (N.D. Ala. 2010) (recognizing that ascertainability is the
“unofficial” first requirement); see also Murphy, supra note 22, at 35 (explaining the notable absence of
ascertainability as a requirement in Rule 23); Shaw, supra note 8, at 2357–58 (describing how federal
courts have recently begun reading an ascertainability requirement into Rule 23).
34
See, e.g., John v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that
acertainability is implied in Rule 23).
35
See, e.g., Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 Fed. App’x 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting the
implicit ascertainability requirement); Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2015) (same);
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015) (same), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161
(2016).
36
See, e.g., Lilly v. Jamba Juice Co., 308 F.R.D. 231, 236 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (decided before Briseno
and holding that ascertainability is an “inherent” requirement of Rule 23).
37
See, e.g., Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding no further
requirements exist under Rule 23), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017); see also, e.g., Mullins v. Direct
Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that nothing implies any additional requirements
under Rule 23), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016); Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026:
A Prognosis, 65 EMORY L.J. 1569, 1607–08 (2016) (predicting that the Supreme Court “will be
sympathetic to the argument that the [strict ascertainability] requirement was invented out of whole
cloth”).
38
See, e.g., Mullins, 795 F.3d at 659 (describing ascertainability in terms of a clear definition of the
class based on objective criteria); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that in order
for a class to be certified, a class must exist); Davoll v. Webb, 160 F.R.D. 142, 144 (D. Colo. 1995)
(holding that the class description must be sufficiently definite); see also 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 1, § 3:2.
39
White v. Williams, 208 F.R.D. 123, 129 (D.N.J. 2002) (citation omitted).
40
1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:2 n.7.
32
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“[a]scertainability . . . allows a trial court effectively to evaluate the explicit
requirements of Rule 23.”41
Second, courts have relied upon Rule 23(c)(1)(B), which requires that a
district court order certifying a class “define the class and the class claims,
issues, or defenses . . . .”42 Added in 2003, this portion of the Rule speaks to
the content of the certification order and does not itself impose a substantive
ascertainability requirement.43 The Advisory Committee note that
accompanied the 2003 amendment to Rule 23 did not even mention Rule
23(c)(1)(B).44 But in discussing Rule 23(c)(1)(A), which requires the district
court to address class certification “at an early practicable time,”45 the
Advisory Committee note raised the “critical need . . . to determine how the
case will be tried” and mentioned the common district court practice of
requiring class counsel to present a trial plan that addresses whether the
common issues “are susceptible of class-wide proof.”46 Seizing upon this
language, the Third Circuit concluded that Rule 23(c)(1)(B) requires a
certification order that includes “a readily discernible, clear and precise
statement of the parameters defining the class . . . .”47 A number of other
courts have also read Rule 23(c)(1)(B) to support an ascertainability
requirement.48
B. Textual Clues that Undermine the Strict Approach to Ascertainability
While language in Rule 23 lends modest support to the traditional
ascertainability requirement, a number of textual clues and tools of statutory
construction undermine the strict approach, which requires the class
representative to demonstrate an administratively feasible mechanism for
determining whether individuals qualify as class members at the time of
certification and before, and independent of, the Rule 23(b)(3) superiority
and manageability analyses. First, Rule 23(a) explicitly identifies four
41

Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2015).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B); see also Coffee & Lahav, supra note 29, at 20 (describing the
ascertainability requirement as “a gloss on the requirements of a class definition (found in Rule
23(c)(1)(B)) and of notice (found in 23(c)(2))”).
43
Accord 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:2.
44
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment; accord Wachtel v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co., 453 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2006).
45
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (requiring the court “[a]t an early practicable time after a person sues
. . . as a class representative, . . . [to] determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action”).
46
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment (noting that, “an increasing
number of courts require a party requesting class certification to present a ‘trial plan’ that describes the
issues likely to be presented at trial and tests whether they are susceptible of class-wide proof” (citation
omitted)).
47
Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 187.
48
1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:2, nn.9–10 (citing Benito v. Indymac Mortg. Servs., No.
2:09-cv-001218, 2010 WL 2089297, at *2 (D. Nev. May 21, 2010); Stanford v. Foamex L.P., 263 F.R.D.
156, 174–75 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Riedel v. XTO Energy, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 494, 506 (E.D. Ark. 2009)).
42
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prerequisites to class certification, but makes no mention of ascertainability
or the need for an administratively feasible method of identifying class
members. Under the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of
construction, the express inclusion of these particular prerequisites in
Rule 23(a) implies an intentional exclusion of other (unlisted) prerequisites,
such as ascertainability.49
Second, Rule 23(b)(3) states that, “The matters pertinent to [assessing
predominance and superiority] include” but apparently are not limited to the
four listed considerations.50 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted,
“[i]f the Rules Advisory Committee had intended to create a non-exhaustive
list in Rule 23(a), it would have used similar language.”51 Thus, the
difference in language used in Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) reinforces the
conclusion that Rule 23(a)’s four express prerequisites constitute an
exhaustive list, thereby freeing the class representative of any obligation to
demonstrate an administratively feasible mechanism for determining
whether individuals qualify as class members as an initial “free-standing”
certification requirement.
Third, Rule 23(b)(3) explicitly requires the district court to consider “the
likely difficulties in managing a class action” in assessing superiority.52 If
Rule 23(a) were read to require an administratively feasible method of
identifying class members, the manageability criterion in Rule 23(b)(3)(D)
would be “largely superfluous.”53 Such a result would be inconsistent with
the canon that “[a]n interpretation that gives effect to every clause is
generally preferable to one that does not.”54 Thus, the text of Rule 23 appears
to undermine the strong approach to ascertainability.
POLICY: THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE TRADITIONAL AND STRICT
APPROACHES TO ASCERTAINABILITY

II.

The text of the current Rule does not resolve the more fundamental
policy question, which is whether the class representative should be required
to demonstrate that the class is ascertainable and, if so, the nature and timing
49

See, e.g., Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Silver v. Sony
Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2005)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017); cf.
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)
(citing expressio unius and Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement to imply the lack of such a
requirement in Rule 8(a)(2)).
50
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (emphasis added).
51
Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1126.
52
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
53
Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1126.
54
See Rep. of Ecuador v. Mackay, 742 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); Briseno,
844 F.3d at 1126 (quoting Mackay); cf. Coffee & Lahav, supra note 29, at 24 (“In many cases, the
predominance requirement does the analytical work that some courts are using the ascertainability
requirement to do, but predominance has the benefit of being part of the Rule.”).
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of the required showing. While lower federal courts have required a definite,
clear, or ascertainable class for over fifty years,55 in recent years some courts
have imposed a far stricter ascertainability prerequisite, requiring (as an
initial class certification prerequisite) an administratively feasible method
for identifying the class members. Acknowledging that some courts eschew
the term “ascertainability” altogether56 and recognizing the difficulty of
categorizing the approach taken by some courts,57 this part of the article
describes the two principal competing approaches to ascertainability and
assesses them from a normative perspective. Section A describes the
traditional approach, while Section B examines the strict approach.
Section C, the heart of Part II, analyzes and assesses the policy rationales
offered in support of these competing approaches to ascertainability.
A. The Traditional Approach
The traditional approach to ascertainability, advanced most thoughtfully
by the Seventh Circuit in Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC,58 requires only
“that a class must be defined clearly and that membership be defined by
objective criteria, rather than by, for example, a class member’s state of
mind.”59 This approach focuses on the adequacy of the class definition itself,
rather than on the potential difficulty of identifying class members.60 In
applying this traditional approach, courts require clarity and objectivity and
reject overbroad class definitions or those that turn on success on the
merits.61
55

For early statements of the ascertainability requirement, see, for example, DeBremaecker v.
Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (stating that the class must be defined and clearly
ascertainable); Giordano v. Radio Corp., 183 F.2d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 1950) (requiring that “members of
the class . . . be capable of definite identification”); Connell v. Higginbotham, 305 F. Supp. 445, 449
(M.D. Fla. 1969) (holding that certification requires a proper representative and an ascertainable class),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Baim & Blank v. Warren-Connelly
Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding that there was no ascertainable class that could be
certified).
56
See, e.g., Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1124 n.3 (refusing to use the term ascertainability because of the
varied meanings ascribed to it).
57
While some courts, such as the Third and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, typify one or the
other of these two approaches, compare Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306–08 (3d Cir. 2013)
(mandating a strict ascertainability requirement in rule 23), with Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d
654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (rejecting explicitly the idea that a
heightened ascertainability applies to Rule 23), other courts’ approaches are more difficult to classify.
58
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 659; see also NOV. 2015 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 15, at 117; Bone, Justifying Class
Action Limits, supra note 8, at 923 (describing “weak” ascertainability as focused on the parameters of
the class itself as opposed to the identities of the class members).
61
In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 266 (2d Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed sub. nom Petroleo
Brasileiro S.A. v. Univ. Superannuation Scheme Ltd. (U.S. Nov. 1, 2017) (17-664); Mullins, 795 F.3d at
657, 659; NOV. 2015 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 15, at 31.

706

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:3

1. Clarity
Courts applying the traditional approach eschew class definitions that
are vague, amorphous, or imprecise.62 Class definitions that incorporate
inherently vague terms, such as “learning disabled,”63 “nearby,”64 “active in
the peace movement,”65 or “prompt,”66 fail the traditional approach to
ascertainability. Even if we knew a person’s IQ, physical distance from a
stationary source of pollution, party affiliation, or time held in jail without a
hearing, we would not know whether or not she were a member of any of
these classes due to the inherent vagueness of the class definitions.67 As
Geoffrey Shaw notes, the problem here is not a lack of proof, but rather a
lack of “conceptual discreteness.”68
In addition to requiring conceptual clarity, courts applying the
traditional approach often look for geographic or temporal delimiters.69
62
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 659 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits,
supra note 8, at 923–24; JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 23.21 (2015);
7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1760 (3d ed. 2015). For a
sophisticated discussion of the epistemic and ontological forms of vagueness, see Shaw, supra note 8, at
2381–83.
63
See, e.g., Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 495 (7th Cir. 2012) (identifying
“indefiniteness” as an “obvious defect” in a class comprised of “disabled students who may have been
eligible for special education but were not identified and remain unidentified” (emphasis omitted));
Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 603–04 (7th Cir. 1980) (concluding that a proposed class of children
with “learning disabilities” who were not properly identified or who did not receive special education
was “so highly diverse and so difficult to identify that it is not adequately defined or nearly
ascertainable”).
64
See, e.g., LaBauve v. Olin Corp., 231 F.R.D. 632, 663 (S.D. Ala. 2005) (concluding that, in a
class action alleging mercury contamination, a subclass of owners of “‘nearby properties’ contaminated
by surface water runoff” was too vague as there were no objective means of determining whether a
property was “nearby” let alone “contaminated”); see also 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:3
(discussing LaBauve).
65
See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Phila. Gas Works, 672 F. Supp. 823, 840–41 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(characterizing a proposed class of those “who have been or who in the future may be denied essential
gas service for arbitrary and capricious reasons” as “so amorphous and broad as to defy definition”);
DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (concluding that a class defined
as state residents who were “active in the peace movement does not constitute an adequately defined or
clearly ascertainable class” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66
See, e.g., Robinson v. Gillespie, 219 F.R.D. 179, 183 (D. Kan. 2003) (rejecting a class definition
that used the word “prompt” because it “is not an objective one which can be measured solely by
reference to hours and minutes”).
67
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Corning, 317 F.R.D. 443, 505 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (decided by a court applying
the strict approach and concluding that the terms “degranulation” and “deterioration” used to describe
roof shingles in the class definition were too “subjective” and rendered the class “not ascertainable”),
appeal filed, No. 16-2653 (3d Cir. June 2, 2016).
68
Shaw, supra note 8, at 2381.
69
See, e.g., Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 139 (1st Cir. 2012) (commenting on the
relevance of “the class period” in assessing ascertainability); Rodriguez v. Berrybrook Farms, Inc., 672
F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (concluding that a class definition that “specifies a group of
agricultural laborers during a specific time frame and at a specific location who were harmed in a specific
way, satisfies the ‘precisely defined’ requirement”); cf. Brecher v. Rep. of Argentina, 806 F.3d 22, 25 &
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Requiring specificity regarding geography, such as state residency or
purchase of a product in a particular geographical area, may enable the
district court to determine if the claims of all class members are governed
by a single state’s law, thereby reducing the likelihood that uncommon legal
questions will predominate.70 Likewise, imposing a temporal delimiter, such
as a purchase within a particular time period, reduces the likelihood that
some members of the class will be subject to individual statute of limitations
defenses.71 In all events, temporal and geographic delimiters help define and
clarify the scope of the class. As the Seventh Circuit put it in Mullins, “[t]o
avoid vagueness, class definitions generally need to identify a particular
group, harmed during a particular time frame, in a particular location, in a
particular way.”72
2. Objective Criteria
If courts applying the traditional approach to ascertainability require
clarity and precision in class definitions, as a corollary they favor objective
criteria in defining the class.73 In lieu of vague and amorphous
characteristics, such as “heavy” or “older” or “having supervisory
responsibilities,” courts gauging ascertainability look for objective criteria,
such as “weighing at least x pounds” or being “at least y years of age” or
serving in positions with particular job titles.74 As Geoffrey Shaw
convincingly posits, while there may be challenges in identifying individuals
who, for example, smoked x number of pack-years of a particular brand of

n.3 (2d Cir. 2015) (decided before Petrobras and focusing heavily on the lack of a temporal delimiter,
while ostensibly requiring administrative feasibility).
70
See, e.g., Keegan v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 284 F.R.D. 504, 538, 545 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
(considering whether California law could govern the claims of nonresidents who had bought their cars
outside the state, stating that the issue “affects the definition of the class and whether common issues
predominate,” and certifying three different state-specific subclasses to avoid predominance problems).
71
See, e.g., Brecher v. Rep. of Argentina, 806 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2015) (requiring “a defined class
period or temporal limitation”); see also Bynum v. Dist. of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27, 32 (D.D.C. 2003)
(stating that the temporal limits imposed in the proposed class definition make it easy for people to
determine whether or not they fall within the scope of the proposed class).
72
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted); see also 1
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:3 (discussing Mullins).
73
See, e.g., 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:3 (discussing courts’ preferences for objective
criteria in class definitions); Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 8, at 923 (describing the
three constraints that the “weak ascertainability” approach places on class definitions).
74
See, e.g., Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 138–39 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining that
the objective standard of job titles makes the proposed class of “individuals . . . employed as baristas”
during a given time period sufficiently defined); Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 539
(6th Cir. 2012) (upholding plaintiff’s proposed class because of the objective criteria used to determine
membership); Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 640 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the use of the phrase “damaged thereby” does not pose an obstacle in establishing a class definition
because it does not make class membership “not precise, objective, or presently ascertainable”).
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cigarette, such an objective criterion is conceptually clear, whereas a class
of “heavy smokers” is not.75
Courts applying the traditional approach are particularly concerned with
class definitions that turn on individuals’ states of mind,76 such as
individuals who were “discouraged” from applying for particular jobs or
programs,77 those who “fear[ed]” prosecution,78 those who were “unaware”
of particular risks,79 or those who were “misled” or “deceived.”80
Class definitions that incorporate subjective states of mind pose three
distinct but related problems. First, many definitions that turn on state of
mind lack the conceptual clarity and precision required in class definitions.81
Even the individuals themselves may not be able to tell whether they are
class members because the subjective criteria employed—being “deceived”
or “offended”—are simply too vague.82 Second, courts would have to
undertake potentially time-consuming, individualized fact-finding to
determine whether each prospective class member had the requisite state of
mind, raising manageability concerns.83 Third, since only the individual
class member herself could know her thoughts and feelings, definitions that
depend upon class members’ subjective states of mind may disadvantage
defendants seeking to challenge class membership.84

75

Shaw, supra note 8, at 2382.
See, e.g., 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, §§ 3:3, 3:5 (discussing the courts’ reluctance to
allow class definitions that take into consideration a potential class member’s state of mind); 7A WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 62, § 1760 (listing cases in which courts rejected proposed class definitions based on
the subjective state of mind inquiries they required).
77
E.g., Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981).
78
E.g., Oldroyd v. Kugler, 352 F. Supp. 27, 31 (D.N.J. 1972), aff’d without op., 412 U.S. 924
(1973).
79
E.g., Kelecseny v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 262 F.R.D. 660, 677 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
80
E.g., Oshana v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 580–81 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 472 F.3d
506 (7th Cir. 2006).
81
See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:5 (“So-called mental state classes may therefore frustrate
fundamental due process tenets of class action litigation by making it difficult for a court to determine
with any certainty who should receive notice, who will be bound by the judgment, and who should receive
any relief obtained from the defendant.”).
82
Accord id. at § 3:5 (“Without sufficient objective criteria to rely upon, whether an individual is
or is not a member of the class is left solely to their own desires and interests.”); Shaw, supra note 8, at
2379.
83
See, e.g., Mueller v. CBS, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 227, 233 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (“[D]etermining
membership in the class would essentially require a mini-hearing on the merits of each class member’s
case, which itself renders a class action inappropriate for addressing the claims at issue.”); Shaw, supra
note 8, at 2380 (noting that courts sometimes tackle “subjective definitions under the heading of
manageability”).
84
This concern underlies the strict approach to ascertainability and will be explored more fully infra
Parts II.B & C. See also 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:5 (discussing how mental state classes
frustrate the abilities of courts to determine who should or should not be a member of a particular class).
76
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3. Breadth
Courts applying the traditional approach to ascertainability seek to
ensure that the class is not defined so broadly as to encompass individuals
“who have little connection with the claim being litigated; rather, it must be
restricted to individuals who are raising the same claims or defenses as the
representative.”85 Stated differently, courts are skeptical of overinclusive
class definitions that encompass both those that have claims against the
defendant and those that do not.86 For example, in one case, the plaintiff sued
video game manufacturers, claiming that a video game contained an
animation defect that barred the player from progressing in the game. 87 The
named plaintiff, who had experienced the defect only after 450 hours of play,
alleged violations of state consumer protection statutes and common law
claims. The plaintiff sued on behalf of all persons or entities residing in the
United States who had purchased the game—“presumably from anyone,
anywhere, at any time—whether or not they ever were injured by (or
experienced) the alleged [a]nimation [d]efect.”88 The class definition was
overbroad in at least two respects. First, the proposed class definition
included stores that purchased and then resold the game, at a profit, without
ever having played the game.89 Not only would such stores have suffered no
financial loss, but they would have had no claim under the state consumerprotection laws.90 Second, the class definition included individuals who may
have purchased the game but had no complaints about it (while excluding
those who received the game as a gift but who had experienced the alleged
defect).91
In another example, a plaintiff filed a class action alleging that the state
police were engaged in racial profiling on the New Jersey Turnpike.92 The
proposed class definition included all persons of color “who were stopped,
85

7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 62, § 1760 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006) (expressing concern that
the proposed class “could include millions who were not deceived [by Coca-Cola’s advertising] and thus
had no grievance under [the state law]”); DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970)
(questioning whether conduct by the Houston police could have chilled antiwar activism in other parts
of the state and concluding that the class definition was therefore “overbroad” to the extent it included
Texan peace activists outside of Houston); Vigus v. S. Ill. Riverboat/Casino Cruises, Inc., 274 F.R.D.
229, 234–35 (S.D. Ill. 2011) (expressing concern over a proposed class definition that would include all
recipients of a prerecorded message because a number of them may have had no issues with receiving
the messages and therefore would have had no cause of action individually).
87
Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 Fed. Appx. 857, 859 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam; not for
publication).
88
Id. at 861 (citing Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28DAB, 2012 WL
834125, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012)).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
White v. Williams, 208 F.R.D. 123, 125 (D.N.J. 2002).
86
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detained, and/or searched” during a specified period by the state police.93
The court deemed the class definition to be “amorphous,” “vague,” and
“overly broad,” and as having “nearly no parameters.”94 In terms of
overbreadth, the court was particularly concerned that the definition did not
“attempt to distinguish between persons who were breaking a traffic law
when they were stopped and those who were not” or “between those who
received citations and those who did not.”95
Two further points should be made about overinclusiveness before
moving on. First, in analyzing overbreadth, courts sometimes distinguish
between classes whose members may ultimately fail to prove that they
suffered harm on the one hand, and classes defined so broadly as to include
large numbers of class members who could not have been harmed by the
defendant’s conduct on the other.96 In the former cases, the class may be
sufficiently well defined but simply fail to prove the merits of its claim, 97
whereas in the latter cases, overinclusiveness may render the class
unascertainable.98 The overbreadth analysis should weed out only classes
likely to include “a great many” who could not have been injured by the
defendants’ conduct, not well-defined classes with potentially losing
claims.99
Second, while courts applying the traditional approach to
ascertainability often examine class definitions for overinclusiveness, not all
courts view the inclusion of some uninjured class members as fatal. As the
First Circuit Court of Appeals explained,
[I]t is difficult to understand why the presence of uninjured
class members at the preliminary stage should defeat class
certification. Ultimately, the defendants will not pay, and the
class members will not recover, amounts attributable to
uninjured class members, and judgment will not be entered in
favor of such members. Some number of uninjured class
members will receive a class notice, but the district court can
easily assure that defendants will not pay for notice to
93

Id. at 129.
Id.
95
Id.
96
See, e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. Healthsystem, 669 F.3d 802, 823–24 (7th Cir. 2012)
(concluding that “an argument that some class members’ claims will fail on the merits . . . [is] a fact
generally irrelevant to . . . class certification”; distinguishing the argument that “the class . . . is fatally
overbroad because it contains members who could not have been harmed by [defendants’ challenged
conduct]” (citations omitted)); see, e.g., Algarin v. Maybelline, LLC, 300 F.R.D. 444, 455 (S.D. Cal.
2014) (holding that potential for presence of uninjured plaintiffs in the class “would not affect the Court’s
analysis of ascertainability,” while “classes that have been found to be overbroad generally include
members who were never exposed to the alleged [harm] at all”).
97
Messner, 669 F.3d at 824 (quoting Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 2010)).
98
Id. (quoting Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009)).
99
Id. at 825 (quoting Kohen, 571 F.3d at 677) (conceding that “[t]here is no precise measure for ‘a
great many’”).
94
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uninjured members. At worst the inclusion of some uninjured
class members is inefficient, but this is counterbalanced by the
overall efficiency of the class action mechanism. Moreover,
excluding all uninjured class members at the certification stage
is almost impossible in many cases, given the
inappropriateness of certifying what is known as a “fail-safe
class”—a class defined in terms of the legal injury.100
4. Avoidance of Fail-Safe Classes
In an effort to avoid overbroad class definitions, class representatives
sometimes err in the other direction by defining the class to include only
those with meritorious claims against the defendant. In fact, as the First
Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized, “there is an almost inevitable
tension between excluding all non-injured parties from the defined class, and
including all injured parties in the defined class.”101 But while courts
applying the traditional approach often reject overinclusive class definitions,
they also reject as “not properly defined”102 so-called “fail-safe”
classes—those defined to include only persons with successful claims on the
merits.103 For example, in a class action filed against a title insurance
company, the plaintiffs sought to represent all persons who had purchased
title insurance from the defendant in connection with mortgage refinancings
and were entitled to a reduced rate under state law but did not receive it.104
Affirming a district court order that declined to certify the class, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a class of purchasers “entitled to
relief” was “an improper fail-safe class that shield[ed] the putative class
members from receiving an adverse judgment. Either the class members win

100
In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2015) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g.,
In re Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d 1003, 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding adequacy and
ascertainability determinations for a class notwithstanding the court’s acknowledgement that it “may
include persons who have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct”).
101
In re Nexium, 777 F.3d at 22.
102
Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161
(2016).
103
See, e.g., id. (describing “fail-safe classes” as problematic because losing plaintiffs are
necessarily defined out of the class); In re Nexium, 777 F.3d at 22 (expressing doubt that defining a failsafe class “will be feasible in many cases”); Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 693 F.3d 532, 538 (6th Cir.
2012) (declaring impermissible those classes that “cannot be defined until the case is resolved on its
merits”); Messner, 669 F.3d at 825 (describing fail-safe classes as “improper”); see also 1 RUBENSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:6 (“Class definitions that require a court to decide the merits of prospective
individual class members’ claims to determine class membership . . . run afoul of the definiteness
requirement.” (footnote omitted)); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 62, § 1760 n.11 (explaining the
requirement that “the proposed class definition must not depend on . . . the merits of the case”). But see
Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Rodriguez), 695 F.3d 360, 370 (5th Cir. 2012)
(concluding that Fifth Circuit precedent “rejects the fail-safe class prohibition”).
104
Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 350 (6th Cir. 2011).
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or, by virtue of losing, they are not in the class, and therefore, not bound by
the judgment.”105
Courts applying the traditional approach reject fail-safe classes for two
principal reasons. First, a fail-safe class denies the defendant the opportunity
to secure a judgment in its favor that is binding on the class. If the class
proves its claims, all class members benefit; if the defendant prevails, no
class members are bound because the class was defined to include only those
with meritorious claims against the defendant.106 Thus, courts view fail-safe
classes as unfair to defendants.107 Second and related, because a judgment in
the defendant’s favor would not bind the absent class members in a fail-safe
class, the litigation would fail to achieve one of the principal goals of class
action litigation: the efficient and final resolution of the claims of all class
members.108
In sum, the principal requirements imposed by courts adopting the
traditional approach to ascertainability are clarity, objective criteria,
attention to breadth, and avoidance of fail-safe classes. Let us now turn to
the strict approach, which imposes far more rigorous certification
requirements.
B. The Strict Approach
The strict approach to ascertainability has been most forcefully
advocated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The
strict approach not only requires that a class be defined with reference to
“objective criteria”109 (like the traditional approach does) but also that there

105

Id. at 352 (footnote and citations omitted).
Messner, 669 F.3d at 825; see also, e.g., Young, 693 F.3d at 538 (defining fail-safe classes as
impermissible because losing defendants are not bound by the judgment (citing Randleman, 646 F.3d at
352)).
107
See, e.g., Mullins, 795 F.3d at 660 (finding fail-safe class certification to “raise[] an obvious
fairness problem for the defendant” because losing plaintiffs can “subject the defendant to another round
of litigation” (citing Geller, supra note 22)); Spread Enters. v. First Data Merch. Servs. Corp., 298 F.R.D.
54, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that the proposed fail-safe class “should not be certified because it is
unfair to defendants” (citation omitted)).
108
See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:6 (identifying problems with “fail-safe” classes and
noting that they fail to finally resolve the claims of all class members, which is a goal of class action
litigation). Courts may also reject fail-safe classes because class definitions that require them to
determine the ultimate question of the defendant’s liability in order to determine whether a person
qualifies as a class member may be “administratively infeasible, as the inquiry into class membership
would require holding countless hearings resembling ‘mini-trials.’” Id. (footnote omitted). Courts
applying the strict approach more typically raise this concern.
109
E.g., Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d
300, 305 (3d Cir. 2013); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013); Marcus v.
BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592–93 (3d Cir. 2012).
106
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be “a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining
whether putative class members fall within the class definition.”110
By
imposing
the
second
requirement—“administrative
feasibility”—courts applying the strict approach heighten the
ascertainability test in four related ways: (1) they require the plaintiff to offer
evidence to prove that the proposed method of identifying class members
will be successful; (2) they require such proof at the outset of the case, as a
certification prerequisite, rather than later in the case, when devising the
claims administration process; (3) they require proof of administrative
feasibility as an independent certification prerequisite, rather than as part of
the Rule 23(b)(3) superiority and manageability analysis; and (4) they reject
class members’ affidavits, standing alone, as proof of class membership.
Because the Third Circuit’s decision in Carrera exemplifies this approach,
much of the discussion that follows is drawn from its opinion.
1. Heightened Ascertainability Requirements
According to the Third Circuit and other courts adopting the strict
approach, to be administratively feasible, the method for identifying class
members must be “a manageable process that does not require much, if any,
individual factual inquiry.”111 Class certification is “inappropriate” unless
the class members can be identified “without extensive and individualized
fact-finding or ‘mini-trials.’”112 It is not enough that the plaintiff has a plan
to identify the absent class members; the plaintiff must offer “evidentiary
support that the [proposed] method will be successful.”113 While recognizing
that the class representative does not actually have to identify the absent
class members at the certification stage, courts adopting the strict approach
require the representative “to show that class members can be identified.”114
Rather than defer resolution of the details and mechanics of class
member identification until later in the litigation—for example, when the
claims administration process is devised—courts adopting the strict
approach require evidence of administrative feasibility at the outset of the
litigation, as a certification prerequisite. The plaintiff must prove “the class
is ‘currently and readily ascertainable’”;115 so the “trial court cannot take a
wait-and-see approach to . . . any . . . requirement of Rule 23.”116 As the
110
City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 442 (3d Cir. 2017)
(citation and internal quotations omitted); Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 (citation omitted); Hayes, 725 F.3d at
355 (citation omitted).
111
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307–08 (quoting 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:3).
112
Id. at 305 (quoting Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593).
113
Id. at 306–07 (emphasis added).
114
Id. at 308 n.2 (emphasis added).
115
Id. at 306 (quoting Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593) (emphasis added).
116
See Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 358 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing numerosity in
particular).
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Third Circuit has stated, “[a] critical need of the trial court at certification is
to determine how the case will be tried, including how the class is to be
ascertained.”117 Moreover, the strict approach appears to treat
ascertainability as a freestanding requirement, considered before and
independent of the Rule 23(b)(3) superiority or manageability analysis.118
While apparently open to reliance upon “company databases,”119 “the
defendants’ records,”120 third-party “retailer records,”121 or other “reliable,
administratively feasible alternative[s]”122 to identify class members, courts
adopting the strict approach are vigilant in protecting the defendant’s
opportunity to “challenge the reliability of those records, perhaps by
deposing a corporate record-keeper.”123 They are particularly leery of
affidavits offered to prove class membership, deriding methods
that would amount to no more than ascertaining [class
membership] by potential class members’ say so. For example,
simply having potential class members submit affidavits . . .
may not be proper or just . . . . Forcing [defendants] to accept
as true absent persons’ declarations that they are members of
the class, without further indicia of reliability, would have
serious due process implications.124
Briefly elaborating, the Third Circuit explained that just as the
“defendant in a class action has a due process right to raise individual
challenges and defenses to claims,” so does the defendant have “a similar, if
not the same, due process right to challenge the proof used to demonstrate
class membership . . . . Ascertainability provides due process by requiring
that a defendant be able to test the reliability of the evidence submitted to
prove class membership.”125

117

Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., id. at 306–12 (discussing ascertainability independently, rather than as part of the Rule
23(b)(3) superiority or manageability analysis); see also Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583,
590–94 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing ascertainability in a separate section entitled, “Preliminary Matters,”
rather than as part of the Rule 23(b)(3) analysis).
119
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593 (citations omitted); accord City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank
of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 437–38 n.1 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasizing the court’s “own view of the
centrality of the database”).
120
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 306 (quoting Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594).
121
Id. at 308.
122
Id. at 304 (quoting Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594).
123
Id. at 308 (footnote omitted).
124
Id. at 306 (quoting Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355
(3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594); see also Hayes, 725 F.3d at 356 (concluding that the
“petition for class certification will founder if the only proof of class membership is the say-so of putative
class members”).
125
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307 (citation omitted).
118
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2. An Illustrative Case
As an illustration of the strict approach and its heightened requirements,
consider Carrera v. Bayer Corp., the Third Circuit opinion that set the
“high-water mark”126 for the strict approach. In that case, Gabriel Carrera
filed a class action against Bayer, alleging that it had falsely advertised its
One-A-Day WeightSmart vitamin by claiming it had metabolism-enhancing
effects.127 Bayer had not sold the product directly to consumers; instead, it
sold it to retail stores, which had sold it to consumers.128 After the district
court certified a class of Florida purchasers,129 Bayer petitioned for
interlocutory appeal, challenging the ascertainability of the class, given
Bayer’s lack of consumer purchase records and the unlikelihood that the
purchasers themselves had documentary proof of purchase.130
Carrera argued that the class could be ascertained by examination of the
sales records of retail stores, like CVS, that had sold the vitamin to
consumers and by the submission of affidavits by the purchasers.131
Regarding retail records, Carrera argued that retail pharmacies track sales
made with loyalty or rewards cards as well as online sales. While conceding
that “retailer records may be a perfectly acceptable method of proving class
membership,” here the court found “no evidence that a single purchaser [of
the challenged product] could be identified using records of customer
membership cards or records of online sales. There is no evidence that
retailers even have records for the relevant period.”132 It is not clear from the
opinion whether the plaintiff merely failed to proffer the records that would
have identified purchasers of the defendant’s product, or whether the records
had been examined but failed to reveal the identities of any purchasers.
The court also rejected reliance on affidavits from class members to
determine class membership.133 Even though the size of each class member’s
claim would have been quite small—the vitamins at issue were much less
expensive than the tires at issue in Marcus—and therefore class members
had little incentive to submit fraudulent affidavits, the court nevertheless
concluded that the defendant “must be able to challenge class
membership.”134 And even though the defendant’s total liability would not

126

Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161

(2016).
127

Carrera, 727 F.3d at 304.
Id.
129
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 08-4716 (JLL), 2011 WL 5878376 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011), vacated
and remanded, 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
130
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 304.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 308–09.
133
Id. at 305.
134
Id. at 309.
128
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have depended upon the number or veracity of the affidavits submitted,135
the court expressed concern that fraudulent claims could dilute the value of
other class members’ claims and expose the defendant to collateral attacks
by absentees arguing that the class representative’s lack of concern for
dilution demonstrated a lack of adequate representation.136 The court was
also deeply skeptical that a model to screen out fraudulent claims could help
render the class ascertainable because the trial court could not “actually see
the model in action” at the time it had to determine ascertainability—i.e., at
the certification stage.137
3. The Third Circuit’s Modest Adjustments
Since deciding Carrera in 2013, the Third Circuit has made several
modest adjustments to the strict approach to ascertainability, recasting the
inquiry as a “narrow” one.138 First, in Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., the Third Circuit
clarified that a class action plaintiff need not actually identify all class
members at the time of certification; instead she “need only show that ‘class
members can be identified.’”139 Thus, the court claimed that “there is no
records requirement” that each class member’s name be known at the time
of certification.140 Second, it declined to “engraft an ‘under-inclusivity’
standard onto the ascertainability requirement.”141 In other words, the
ascertainability requirement does not require the class to include all
individuals potentially harmed by the defendant’s conduct; any injured
individuals excluded from the class would not be bound by the judgment.142
Third, the Byrd court acknowledged that “[t]here will always be some level
of inquiry required to verify that a person is a member of a class . . . .”143
Thus, a class may be ascertainable and hence certifiable even if the district
court has to undertake some inquiry to determine whether individuals qualify
as class members.144 The court reinforced this point in In re Community Bank
of Northern Virginia Mortgage Lending Practices Litigation, where it
135
The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s liability under the Florida deceptive practices statute
would “not increase or decrease based on the affidavits submitted,” but rather would be based upon the
amount of the product the defendant had sold in the state. Id. at 309–10.
136
Id. at 310.
137
Id. at 311.
138
Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2015).
139
Id. at 163 (quoting Carrera, 727 F.3d at 308 n.2).
140
Id. at 164; see also City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am., Inc., 867 F.3d 434,
441 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating that “[p]laintiff need not, at the class certification stage, demonstrate that a
single record, or set of records, conclusively establishes class membership” (citing Byrd, 784 F.3d at
163)).
141
Byrd, 784 F.3d at 167.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 170.
144
Id. at 171 (“Certainly, Carrera does not suggest that no level of inquiry as to the identity of class
members can ever be undertaken.”); accord City Select Auto, 867 F.3d at 441.
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affirmed a class certification order even though the district court would have
to consult bank records, “and then follow a few steps to determine whether
[each prospective class member were] the real party in interest.”145
Finally, in City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of North America
Inc., the Third Circuit’s most recent pronouncement on ascertainability,146
the court explained that its “ascertainability precedents do not categorically
preclude affidavits from potential class members, in combination with [the
defendant’s] database, from satisfying the ascertainability standard,”147
apparently conceding that “[a]ffidavits, in combination with records or other
reliable and administratively feasible means, can meet the ascertainability
standard.”148 In particular, the court left open the possibility that the class
might be ascertainable, depending upon “the level of individualized factfinding” that would be required and the “amount of over-inclusiveness, if
any,” of the defendant’s database.149
Welcome though these modest adjustments to the Third Circuit’s
approach may be, they do not limit the defining requirements of the strict
approach: the court continues to require a “reliable and administratively
feasible mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall
within the class definition”;150 it continues to require the plaintiff to offer
evidence that the class is “currently . . . ascertainable”;151 it continues to treat
the requirement as a “prerequisite” to class certification, separate from Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement;152 and perhaps most significantly,
despite its statement that “there is no records requirement,”153 the Third
Circuit continues to require “‘objective records’ that can ‘readily identify’
the[] class members.”154 Notwithstanding its most recent concession
145

In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380, 397 (3d Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1167 (2016).
146
In a later decision, Luppino v. Mercedes Benz USA, the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s
denial of class certification. While the district court had “found the class was not ascertainable,” the Third
Circuit affirmed on other grounds, declining to discuss ascertainability. Luppino v. Mercedes Benz USA,
No. 16-3762, 2017 WL 6015698, at *2 (3d Cir. Dec. 5, 2017).
147
City Select Auto, 867 F.3d at 440 (emphasis added).
148
Id. at 441 (emphasis added) (citing Byrd, 784 F.3d at 170–71).
149
Id. at 442 & n.4.
150
Byrd, 784 F.3d at 170 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord City Select Auto,
867 F.3d at 441; In re Cmty. Bank, 795 F.3d at 396.
151
City Select Auto, 867 F.3d at 439 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380, 396 (3d Cir. 2015)
(emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
152
Byrd, 784 F.3d at 162, 164; accord City Select Auto, 867 F.3d at 439.
153
Byrd, 784 F.3d at 164.
154
Id. at 169 (citations omitted); see id. at 173 n.4 (Rendell, C.J., concurring) (maintaining that the
very reason “the class in Carrera failed the ascertainability test [was] because there were no records from
which the class members could be ascertained with certainty” (citation omitted)); see also Jonah M.
Knobler & J. Taylor Kirklin, City Select v. BMW: Ascertainability is Alive and Well in the Third Circuit,
BLOOMBERG BNA CLASS ACTION LITIG. REPORT (Sept. 22, 2017) (maintaining that notwithstanding its
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regarding the potential use of affidavits “in combination with records” to
demonstrate ascertainability, the Third Circuit continues to emphasize the
“centrality of the [defendant’s] database,”155 and maintain that “affidavits
from potential class members, standing alone, without ‘records to identify
class members or a method to weed out unreliable affidavits,’ will not
constitute a reliable and administratively feasible means of determining class
membership.”156 Lower courts within the Third Circuit have denied class
certification on ascertainability grounds if class members lacked receipts or
other records of their purchases even after Byrd and In re Community Bank,
demonstrating their understanding that the core requirements of the Third
Circuit’s strict approach have not been eased significantly.157
With this understanding of the principal differences between the
traditional and strict approaches to ascertainability under our belts, let us
now consider the policies underlying these different approaches.
C. Policies Underlying the Traditional and Strict Approaches to
Ascertainability
1. Efficiency and Administrative Convenience
Virtually all courts that address ascertainability mention the need to
minimize the administrative burdens associated with class action litigation.
Courts applying the traditional approach to ascertainability thus require
objective criteria for class membership to avoid time-consuming,
individualized fact-finding to determine whether individuals qualify for
class membership.158 Likewise, courts adopting the strict approach require a
recent decision in City Select, “the ‘heightened’ ascertainability test is alive and well in the Third
Circuit”).
155
City Select Auto, 867 F.3d at 437–38 n.1.
156
Id. at 441 (citing Byrd, 784 F.3d at 171). Moreover, “the City Select court did not hold that
affidavits would in fact render the putative class ascertainable. It expressly left open the possibility that,
even in combination with the database, affidavits might still flunk the test.” Knobler & Kirklin, supra
note 154, at 3; see City Select Auto, 867 F.3d at 442 & n.4.
157
See, e.g., Jarzyna v. Home Props., L.P., 321 F.R.D. 237, at 244 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (discussing the
difficulty of identifying tenants who were charged late fees); Kotsur v. Goodman Glob., Inc., No. 141147, 2016 WL 4430609, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (concluding that the plaintiff’s proposed method of
determining whether putative class members were within the class definition was not “reliable and
administratively feasible”); In Re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 312 F.R.D. 124, 138–39 (E.D.
Pa. 2015) (discussing the difficulty of ascertaining the purchasers of eggs since there were no objective
records).
158
See, e.g., Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 495–96 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing
the indefiniteness of a class of disabled students who were “not identified and remain unidentified”);
Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 538–39 (6th Cir. 2012) (positing that a court must be
able to “resolve the question of whether class members are included or excluded from the class by
objective criteria.”); Bennett v. Hayes Robertson Grp, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1278 (S.D. Fla. 2012)
(discussing permissible defining criteria); Mueller v. CBS, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 227, 233 (W.D. Pa. 2001)
(identifying problems with the plaintiffs’ proposed class definition); see also 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,
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reliable and administratively feasible means of identifying class members to
avoid individualized fact-finding or “mini-trials.”159 Since one of the
principal goals of the class action is efficiency, 160 it would be
counterproductive if courts had to conduct time-consuming, individualized
hearings to determine whether each putative class member in fact qualified
for class membership.
While courts applying both approaches consider efficiency and
administrative convenience, they differ in terms of the timing and
independence of the ascertainability analysis as well as the weight they
accord it. The Third Circuit, which applies the strict approach, emphasizes
that “[a]scertainability mandates a rigorous approach at the outset . . . .”161
In Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., decided less than two years after Carrera, the Third
Circuit added that the ascertainability analysis should not be
“infuse[d] . . . with other class-certification requirements.”162 Thus, the Third
Circuit appears to treat ascertainability and administrative feasibility as
questions to be addressed prior to and independent of the other Rule 23
requirements.163
Unlike the Third Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, which follows the
traditional approach, urges trial courts to defer analysis of administrative
convenience until they assess superiority and manageability under
Rule 23(b)(3).164 Doing so offers several important benefits, according to the
Seventh Circuit. First, it avoids rendering the manageability prong of
Rule 23(b)(3) unnecessary. In the Seventh Circuit’s view, if a trial court
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:2 (14th ed. 2017) (explaining that
individualized scrutiny of a class is counter to “the requirement of objective ascertainability”).
159
Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 Fed. App’x. 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2015); Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,
727 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2013); Marcus v. BMW N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012).
160
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 158. The class action vehicle fosters efficiency when “plaintiffs’
claims are large enough to justify individual lawsuits,” and Rule 23 “provid[es] a vehicle for the
prosecution of many individual claims in a single positive-value class action . . . .” Rhonda Wasserman,
Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule and Successive Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV. 803, 819 (2006).
With respect to negative-value class actions, class actions under Rule 23 serve a different function—they
provide access to court by permitting claimants to “pool their resources and spread litigation costs among
a large group of claimants.” Id. (footnote omitted).
161
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307.
162
784 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2015).
163
See id. (Rendell, C.J., concurring) (chastising the Third Circuit majority for putting “the class
action cart before the horse”); see also MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 158 (explaining the additional
ascertainability requirement).
164
Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161
(2016); see also In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 268 (2d Cir. 2017) (reiterating the Seventh Circuit’s
ascertainability criteria), petition for cert. filed sub. nom Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. v. Universities
Superannuation Scheme Ltd. (U.S. Nov. 1, 2017) (17-664). Under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may certify a
class if the Rule 23(a) requirements are met, the common questions predominate over the individual ones,
and “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). In assessing superiority, the district court should consider “the
likely difficulties in managing a class action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
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were to assess administrative convenience as part of an independent
ascertainability analysis and insist upon proof of a “reliable and
administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative class
members fall within the class definition”165 at the outset, it would render the
manageability prong of Rule 23(b)(3) superfluous.166
Second, deferral facilitates consideration of administrative convenience
in the context of the other costs and benefits of the class action.167 The order
and separateness of its treatment have practical consequences:
When administrative inconvenience is addressed as a matter
of ascertainability, courts tend to look at the problem in a
vacuum, considering only the administrative costs and
headaches of proceeding as a class action. But when courts
approach the issue as part of a careful application of
Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority standard, they must recognize both
the costs and benefits of the class device.
Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement, unlike the
freestanding ascertainability requirement, is comparative: the
court must assess efficiency with an eye toward “other
available methods.” In many cases where the heightened
ascertainability requirement will be hardest to satisfy, there
realistically is no other alternative to class treatment.
This does not mean, of course, that district courts should
automatically certify classes in these difficult cases. But it
does mean that before refusing to certify a class that meets the
requirements of Rule 23(a), the district court should consider
the alternatives as Rule 23(b)(3) instructs rather than denying
certification because it may be challenging to identify
particular class members.168
Negative-value consumer class actions are often not just “superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
165

Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 (citing Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013);
Marcus v. BMW N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593–94 (3d Cir. 2012)).
166
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663 (citing Luks, supra note 22, at 2395); supra Part I.B.
167
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663; see also, e.g., 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 62, at § 1780
(explaining that administrative problems must be “weighed against the benefits in maintaining the action
under rule 23”); Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 8, at 934 (stating that the management
cost of class certification “must be balanced against the benefits of a class action”); Coffee & Lahav,
supra note 29, at 25 (positing that courts “prefer considering these issues as part of the 23(b)(3) analysis
rather than as a separate heightened ascertainability requirement [because] the structure of the Rule
permits balancing . . . whereas the ascertainability requirement . . . does not”).
168
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663–64 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); accord City Select Auto
Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 448 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, C.J., concurring)
(rejecting a “separate manageability requirement within ascertainability”).
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169

controversy”; they are the only available method for resolving claims
worth less, per claimant, than the costs of litigation.170 Since a majority of
federal class actions settle,171 and since the terms of the settlement
agreements may alleviate some of the courts’ administrative concerns, it
often will make sense for trial courts to “wait and see” how serious the
administrative problems will be, in light of information gleaned during the
pendency of the actions, including “available records, response rates, and
other relevant factors.”172 Burdening the class representative with the cost of
proving an administratively feasible method for identifying class members
at the outset of the litigation may sound the death knell for certain class
actions, thereby allowing some defendants to escape all liability for
wrongdoing.173
Courts applying the traditional and strict approaches to ascertainability
not only assess administrative convenience at different times in the analysis;
more importantly, they also assign it different weight. Under the Third
Circuit’s strict approach, if the plaintiff lacks proof that an administratively
feasible and reliable method exists to identify class members, the trial court
should deny class certification, even if doing so denies class members their
only hope of recourse.174 As Judge Rendell of the Third Circuit plaintively
acknowledged, the court’s heavy emphasis on administrative ease at the
expense of the merits “effectively thwart[s] small-value consumer class
actions by defining ascertainability in such a way that consumer classes will
necessarily fail to satisfy for lack of adequate substantiation.”175 The Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, place less weight on
administrative convenience, reminding trial courts that they “should not

169

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 664.
171
See Svetlana Starykh & Stefan Boettrich, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation:
2015 Full Year Review, NERA ECON. CONSULTING 38 (Jan. 25, 2016) (stating that “[v]ery few securities
class actions reach the trial stage and even fewer reach a verdict,” and “[n]o trials [in securities class
actions]
were held in 2015”), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016/
2015_Securities_Trends_Report_NERA.pdf [https://perma.cc/89AZ-TT99]; Rhonda Wasserman, Cy
Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 102 n.18 (2014) [hereinafter Wasserman, Cy
Pres] (explaining that fewer class actions settle than previously concluded); cf. Klonoff, supra note 37,
at 1645 (citing “an important new trend” of class actions going to trial).
172
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 664 (citing Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.
2004)).
173
Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Certification Vacated for Weight Loss Pill Class; Ascertainability Must
Be Shown on Remand, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REPORT (BNA) (Sept. 13, 2013) (quoting Brian Wolfman);
cf. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 359 (1978) (concluding that when trial courts order
defendants to help identify class members entitled to notice, they “must not stray too far from the
principle underlying Eisen IV that the representative plaintiff should bear all costs relating to the sending
of notice”).
174
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 308 (3d Cir. 2013).
175
Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 174 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, C.J., concurring).
170
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refuse to certify a class merely on the basis of manageability concerns.”176
Like Judge Rendell, who declined to assume that class members “burden the
court” when they file claims,177 the Seventh Circuit rejected administrative
convenience as a justification for evasion of judicial responsibilities under
Rule 23.178
As a normative matter, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits surely
have the better argument. Since the courts’ very purpose is to administer
justice, concern for judicial convenience alone should not justify dismissal
of claims that cannot be pursued outside the class action context. Likewise,
since trial courts do not need to distribute funds to class members until much
later in the litigation, it makes sense to delay consideration of
administrability at least until the court undertakes the manageability analysis
required by Rule 23(b)(3), if not until much later in the action, when it
contemplates the claims administration process. At that time, armed with
more information, including the availability of purchase records, response
rates, and other data, the trial court will be in a better position to assess case
management challenges and attempt to address them, or to decertify the class
if the management problems prove insurmountable.179
Even if the strict approach does not defeat a class action, it requires class
counsel to take more discovery regarding class membership earlier in the
litigation, thereby increasing the cost of bringing a class action.180 That result
is “ironic” if the goal of the ascertainability requirement is efficiency and
administrative convenience.181
2. Protection of Absent Class Members
Courts employing both the traditional and strict approaches claim that
the ascertainability requirement protects absent class members in at least two
ways. First, courts claim the ascertainability requirement is needed to ensure
that absent class members receive the best notice practicable, as required by

176
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663 (citations omitted); accord In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 268
(2d Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed sub. nom Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. v. Universities Superannuation
Scheme Ltd. (U.S. Nov. 1, 2017) (17-664); Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1128
(9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017).
177
Byrd, 784 F.3d at 175 (Rendell, C.J., concurring).
178
See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663–64 (quoting 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 62, at § 1780)
(“Viewing the potential administrative difficulties from a comparative perspective seems sound and a
decision against class action treatment should be rendered only when the ministerial efforts simply will
not produce corresponding efficiencies. In no event should the court use the possibility of becoming
involved with the administration of a complex lawsuit as a justification for evading the responsibilities
imposed by Rule 23.”).
179
Id. at 664 (citation omitted).
180
Kamens, supra note 173 (quoting Brian Wolfman).
181
Id.
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183

Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and due process, to enable them to exercise their
respective rights to opt out of the class.184 If class members can be readily
identified, then they often can be notified by mail, a means of providing
notice that the Supreme Court has lauded at least since Mullane,185 or by
email, a less expensive alternative often relied upon by courts today.186 But
if the class is unascertainable and class members’ identities are unknowable,
then service by mail or email will be impossible and only less certain means
of providing notice will be available. Thus, courts stress the need for
precision in class definitions to ensure that courts will “be able to identify
who will receive notice . . . .”187 One treatise makes the related point that
class members must be able to tell if they are included in the class so they
can decide whether or not to opt out.188
Second, courts adopting both the traditional and strict approaches claim
that the ascertainability requirement helps ensure that the amount recovered
by absent class members with legitimate claims is not diluted by inaccurate
or fraudulent claims. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Mullins
acknowledged that “[v]agueness is a problem because a court needs to be
able to identify who . . . will share in any recovery . . . .”189 More specifically,
the Third Circuit in Carrera stated that “ascertainability protects absent class
members . . . . It is unfair to absent class members if there is a significant
likelihood that their recovery will be diluted by fraudulent or inaccurate
claims.”190
But while there may be agreement that a clear and objective class
definition will facilitate notice and maximize recovery to deserving class
members, there is profound disagreement on whether requiring an
administratively feasible method of identifying class members at the outset
of the litigation is necessary to achieve these ends. In fact, neither of these
proffered rationales justifies the strict approach. After all, Rule 23(c)(2)(B),
182

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985).
184
See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F. 3d 300, 305–07 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that the ascertainability
requirement “protects absent class members by facilitating the best notice practicable under Rule
23(c)(2),” and “allows potential class members to identify themselves for purposes of opting out of a
class” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC,
687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.222 (4th ed. 2004).
185
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318–19 (1950); see also Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974).
186
For examples of cases accepting email as a sufficient mode of service to class members, see, for
example, Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., 809 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 2015); In re Online DVD-Rental
Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 947 (9th Cir. 2015); Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 818, 826
(9th Cir. 2012); Flynn v. Sony Electronics, Inc., No. 09-CV-2109-BAS (MDD), 2015 WL 128039
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2015), at *1–2; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2)(E).
187
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
188
1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 158, § 4:2.
189
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 660 (citation omitted).
190
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013).
183
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which governs notice in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, does not require that all
absentees receive actual notice;191 rather, it requires only “the best notice
that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”192 Nor does due
process require actual notice to all class members in all cases.193 The seminal
notice case, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., itself recognized
that the type of notice required by due process would depend, in any given
case, upon “practical matters,” including the difficulty of identifying
interested parties and “the nature” of their interests.194 Regarding “persons
missing or unknown,” the Mullane Court concluded that “an indirect or even
a probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and
creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights.”195
Thus, regarding absentees “whose interests or whereabouts could not with
due diligence be ascertained,” the Mullane Court upheld the constitutionality
of notice by publication in the back pages of a local newspaper.196
Today, courts have at their disposal a wide range of alternate means of
providing notice that are more likely than the means sanctioned in Mullane
to reach absentees who cannot be identified. Courts have allowed notice by
large advertisements in national newspapers197 and magazines,198 television
and radio spots,199 websites,200 social media posts,201 and postings in

191

Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
193
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665; Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 8, at 930.
194
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317–18 (1950).
195
Id. at 317.
196
Id.
197
See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2012) (allowing publication of the
notice in the national edition of USA Today); 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 62, § 1786 (noting courts
have allowed notice published in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal); see also Hughes v. Kore
of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding notice in a principal Indianapolis
newspaper to be adequate notice).
198
See Flynn v. Sony Elect., Inc., No. 09-cv-2109-BAS (MDD), 2015 WL 128039, at *4 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 7, 2015) (approving notice in People magazine).
199
See, e.g., In re Black Farmers Discrim. Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2011)
(acknowledging notice was broadcast on two national radio stations); see also 7AA WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 62, § 1786 (stating it may be appropriate to publish notice as radio or television
advertisements).
200
See, e.g., In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 947 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding
notice was not deficient, in part, because the website it was posted on was updated promptly); Hughes,
731 F.3d at 677 (stating notice was published on a website in addition to other means); Lane, 696 F.3d
at 818 (noting all forms of notice directed class members to a website); Evans v. Linden Research, Inc.,
No. C-11-01078 DMR, 2013 WL 5781284, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (approving notice publication
on six websites).
201
See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 818 (allowing Facebook to post notice on a section of members’
online accounts); Mark v. Gawker Media LLC, No. 13-cv-4347 (AJN), 2015 WL 2330274, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2015) (describing the limitations on the planned notice via Twitter and Facebook but
approving the notice method generally); Evans, 2013 WL 5781284, at *3 (allowing notice to appear on
192
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202

conspicuous places.
A proposed amendment to Rule 23(c)(2)(B),
approved by the Judicial Conference and slated to take effect on December
1, 2018, will clarify that class action notice in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions
“may be by one or more of the following: United States mail, electronic
means, or other appropriate means.”203
More fundamentally, in many consumer and other low-value class
actions, the likelihood that class members would exclude themselves and
pursue actions on their own behalf if they received notice is infinitesimal.
As the Seventh Circuit put it, in such cases, “only a lunatic or a fanatic would
litigate the claim individually, so opt-out rights are not likely to be exercised
by anyone planning a separate individual lawsuit.”204 To insist upon an
administratively feasible means of identifying class members to facilitate
notice and enable opt-outs is to deny all class members the possibility of
recovery to protect a null set of them. Thus, it is hard to justify the strict
approach to ascertainability based upon a need to provide notice to absent
class members so they may decide whether or not to opt out.
Likewise, the professed interest in preventing the dilution of the
recovery of absentees with legitimate claims offers little, if any, support for
the strict approach to ascertainability.
First, it is highly unlikely that many (if any) individuals would invest
the time needed to complete a fraudulent claim form since the maximum
recovery in these low-value consumer class actions is typically very low.205
Under a rational cost-benefit analysis, the potential recovery is not likely to
outweigh the cost of completing the form and the risk (however small) of a
perjury charge. Thus, the risk of dilution is likely quite low.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that participation rates in
consumer and other low-value class actions are often so low that courts must
devise strategies to distribute all of the settlement funds that defendants
Facebook); see also Klonoff, supra note 37, at 1650–51 (describing the use of social media to provide
notice in class actions).
202
See, e.g., Hughes, 731 F.3d at 677 (approving sticker notices on the defendant’s ATMs).
203
Chart Tracking Proposed Rules Amendments, in AGENDA BOOK FOR JAN. 4, 2018, MEETING OF
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE [hereinafter JAN. 2018 AGENDA BOOK], at 105, 107,
tab 1C (documenting approval by Judicial Conference of proposed amendment to Rule 23); Report of
May 18, 2017, of Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, at 18,
20, 28, 31 in AGENDA BOOK FOR JUNE 12–13, 2017, MEETING OF COMM. ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
[hereinafter JUNE 2017 AGENDA BOOK], at 432, 434, 442, 445 tab 4A (presenting proposed amendment
of Rule 23(c)(2)(B) for approval); see also Rule 23 Subcomm. Report Containing the Text of Proposed
Rule 23, in AGENDA BOOK FOR APRIL 25–26, 2017, MEETING OF ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES
[hereinafter APR. 2017 AGENDA BOOK], at 105, 108, 117, & 120, tab 4A.
204
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Carnegie v.
Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Hughes, 731 F.3d at 667 (stating that “in practice, the risk of dilution based on fraudulent or mistaken
claims seems low, perhaps to the point of being negligible”); Bone, supra note 8, at 931.
205
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667 (citing Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 175 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell,
C.J., concurring)).
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206

commit to pay. In fact, in some cases, courts have distributed double or
treble damages to class members submitting claims forms because
participation rates were, or were expected to be, so low.207 Thus, in the many
class actions in which unclaimed settlement funds remain, the unlikely
prospect of some fraudulent or inaccurate claims is not likely to dilute the
recovery of absentees with legitimate claims.208
Second, professional claims administration firms deploy a host of
methods to discourage, identify, and reject fraudulent claims.209 In
particular, they use programmatic audits, algorithms, screening methods
based on product packaging descriptions, purchase time-frames, methods of
purchase, and data matching and loading technologies to identify duplicate
and fraudulent claims.210
For example, by requiring a class member to provide
information about which particular retail establishment they
purchased the allegedly defective (or fraudulently marketed)
product, a claims administrator could cross reference the class
member’s response against a list of known retailers and
identify those claims with false information. Likewise, certain
products are only sold in a particular geographic location so a
class member who claimed, for example, to buy a product in a
drug store in Tennessee when the defendant’s product was
only sold on the Eastern sea board, would be flagged and
rejected.211
Thus, given the powerful tools in the hands of claims administrators to
reduce the likelihood of, and to identify and screen out, inaccurate or
fraudulent claims, it does not appear that concern for dilution of meritorious
class members’ claims justifies the strict approach.
206
Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1130 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017); Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667; see also, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The
Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71,
119–20 (2007) (noting that, “it is not unusual for only 10 or 15% of the class members to bother filing
claims”; bemoaning “shockingly low participation rates,” sometimes lower than 1% (footnotes
omitted)); Wasserman, Cy Pres, supra note 171, at 104–05, 117 (noting that “the cumbersomeness of the
claims process” and the prospect of tiny awards may dissuade class members from submitting claims
forms; noting that courts often resort to cy pres to distribute unclaimed settlement funds).
207
Wasserman, Cy Pres, supra note 171, at 111–12; see also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 cmt. b (2010).
208
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667.
209
Id.; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 184, § 21.66 (describing audit and
review procedures, random sampling techniques, and field audits to screen out fraudulent or inaccurate
claims).
210
Brief for Angeion Group, LLC, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Pet. for Reh. or Reh. en Banc at
5–8, Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-2621), 2013 WL 5606438 (filed Oct.
4, 2013).
211
Id. at 6–7.
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Finally, even if these tools are imperfect and fail to screen out every
possibly fraudulent claim, a rational absentee would prefer to receive a
slightly smaller (diluted) award than to have the class action dismissed and
therefore to be denied the opportunity to receive any award because the class
representative was unable to satisfy the strict ascertainability requirement.212
3. Protection of Defendants
Courts espousing the strict approach further maintain that an
administratively feasible means of identifying class members at the outset
of the action is needed to protect class action defendants in three ways.213
They recognize class action defendants’ “due process right to raise
individual challenges and defenses to claims” and maintain that “class
actions cannot be certified in a way that eviscerates this right or masks
individual issues.”214 If defendants were required to accept class members’
self-serving affidavits to prove class membership, they would lose the
opportunity to test the reliability of evidence, thereby raising “serious due
process implications.”215 Thus, courts maintain that “[a]scertainability
provides due process by requiring that a defendant be able to test the
reliability of the evidence submitted to prove class membership”216 and
ultimately the amount of its liability.217
Moreover, some courts maintain that the strict approach protects the
defendant from the risk of follow-up individual actions upon resolution of
the class action. If the defendant prevails against the class, the judgment in
its favor should shield it from follow-up suits by individual class members
pressing the same claim.218 But if class members’ identities are not
established because the class is unascertainable, then the defendant may be
denied this important protection. “The class definition must be clear . . . so
212

See Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that “if
certification is denied to prevent dilutions, deserving class members will received nothing”), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 313 (2017); Mullins, 795 F.3d at 668 (noting “if class certification is denied, [absentees] will
receive nothing, for they would not have brought suit individually in the first place” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 176 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, C.J., concurring)
(noting that dilution concerns are “unrealistic in modern day class action practice”).
213
See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining how
ascertainability protects defendants’ rights); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593
(3d Cir. 2012) (noting that strict ascertainability ensures class members are bound by the final judgment).
214
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307 (citations omitted).
215
Id. at 306 (quoting Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594 (footnote omitted)); accord Karhu v. Vital Pharms.,
Inc., 621 Fed. Appx. 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2015).
216
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307.
217
Cf. Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 669 (7th Cir. 2015) (conceding that “a
defendant [certainly] has a due process right not to pay in excess of its liability and to present
individualized defenses if those defenses affect its liability” (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564
U.S. 338, 366 (2011)), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016).
218
Xavier v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (decided before
Briseno); see Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593 (quoting Xavier).
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that it will be clear later on whose rights are merged into the judgement, that
is, who gets the benefit of any relief and who gets the burden of any
loss.”219
If a court allowed unverified and potentially fraudulent claims by
putative class members that reduced the recovery by those with legitimate
claims, the latter might bring follow-up suits, arguing that the class action
judgment did not preclude them because they were not adequately
represented in the class action.220 Thus, the strict approach to ascertainability
ostensibly protects the defendant by ensuring that losing class members are
bound by the judgment.
Class action defendants are surely entitled to due process, but their
respective rights to due process cannot justify the strict approach. The due
process argument ignores the reality that most class actions are concluded
by negotiated settlements approved by district courts.221 Thus, in the
majority of class actions (those that settle), knowing the class members’
identities at the time of certification is not needed to test the accuracy of the
defendant’s overall liability; that figure will be negotiated, rather than
litigated; and the defendant will waive its right, or negotiate the means, to
challenge each class member’s entitlement to recover a portion of it.
Even in the class actions that do not settle, however, due process does
not guarantee the defendant a right to identify the class members at the
certification stage.222 In some class actions, the defendant’s liability will be
determined in the aggregate and therefore will be unaffected by the number
of putative class members who eventually file claims.223 In these cases, too,
whether an individual qualifies for class membership or not has no impact
on the defendant’s total liability and therefore does not implicate the
defendant’s due process rights.224 As a leading class action treatise explains,
“courts have generally rejected the argument that a plaintiff’s ability to
demonstrate only aggregate damages violates a defendant’s due process
and/or jury rights to confront and contest each individual’s right to
damages.”225 In yet other cases, where the defendant’s total liability cannot
be determined in the aggregate, there may be a common method of
determining individual damages that both protects the defendant’s due
219

Xavier, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 1089 (emphasis added); see Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593 (quoting Xavier);
see also 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 3:1.
220
Karhu, 621 Fed. Appx. at 948 n.3 (quoting Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310).
221
See Starykh & Boettrich, supra note 171, at 38 (stating that “[v]ery few securities class actions
reach the trial stage and even fewer reach a verdict”).
222
See, e.g., Mullins, 795 F.3d at 669 (agreeing “with the due process premise but not the
conclusion”).
223
Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
313 (2017); Mullins, 795 F.3d at 670.
224
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 670.
225
4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 12:2 (footnote omitted).
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process rights and minimizes the need for time-consuming individual
mini-trials on damages.226
Even where no common method of calculating individual damages is
available, due process can be satisfied as long as the defendant is afforded
an opportunity to present its defenses when the putative class members
eventually submit their claims.227 As the Seventh Circuit put it, the
Constitution does not entitle the defendant to a process that identifies class
members “with perfect accuracy at the certification stage”;228 due process is
satisfied “[a]s long as the defendant is given the opportunity to challenge
each class member’s claim to recover during the damages phase.”229
While the potential need to conduct mini-trials on each individual class
member’s entitlement to damages at the end of the litigation raises
predominance and manageability concerns, federal district courts have a
variety of means available, including the appointment of special masters, to
help them “resolve individual damages issues in an efficient enough manner
that such issues will not predominate over the common issues in the case.”230
If “truly insoluble” manageability problems arise during the claims
administration process, “the court may decertify the class at a later stage of
the litigation.”231 Thus, the strict approach to ascertainability is not needed
to protect the defendant’s right to raise defenses against individual class
members or to challenge the amount of its overall liability.
Nor is the strict approach needed to ensure that a prevailing class action
defendant can invoke the judgment to preclude follow-up claims by absent
class members. As long as the class is defined by objective criteria, a class
action defendant will be able to invoke the class action judgment in its favor
to preclude follow-up litigation by class members.232 By claiming a right to
recover for the same conduct that was challenged in the class action, any

226
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 670; see also 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 12:4 (noting that “in many
class actions . . . individual damages are easily calculable”); id. § 12:5 (describing “a variety of common
methods for determining individual damages”).
227
See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 671 (“So long as the defendant is given a fair opportunity to challenge
the claim to class membership and to contest the amount owed each claimant during the claims
administration process, its due process rights have been protected.”); Bone, Justifying Class Action
Limits, supra note 8, at 938–39.
228
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 670 (emphasis added).
229
Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
230
4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 12:5.
231
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 664 (citing Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.
2004)).
232
See 6 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, §§ 18:14 & 18:15 (discussing fundamental elements of claim
preclusion and class action judgments); 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 4455 (2d ed. 2002 & Dec. 2017 Supp.) (stating that a “central purpose” of the class action
“is to establish a judgment that will bind . . . all . . . members of the class”); Bone, Justifying Class Action
Limits, supra note 8, at 932 (explaining that a clear class definition is essential to a court determining the
preclusive effect of a class action judgment).
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prospective follow-up plaintiff would essentially self-identify as a member
of the class whose claim had been precluded by the class action judgment.233
Finally, the risk that the defendant will be subject to follow-up litigation
by class members maintaining that they are not bound by the class action
judgment because their claims were diluted by fraudulent claims and
therefore their interests were not adequately represented is quite low. It
assumes the coincidence of several events, each of which itself is quite
unlikely. Because the value of individual claims pursued in consumer class
actions is often very low—perhaps just a few dollars—few fraudulent claims
are likely to be filed.234 Even if individuals were more inclined to file
fraudulent or inaccurate claims, courts and claims administrators have
effective tools to screen them out, thereby further reducing the risk of
dilution.235 Especially if the defendant prevailed against the class, it would
be unlikely that many (if any) class members would seek to press individual
claims in follow-up litigation—because their individual claims would likely
be worth so little, because a court would already have ruled against a class
pressing the same or similar claims, and because the prospective follow-up
plaintiffs would have the formidable burden of proving inadequate
representation by the class representative.236 Thus, the theoretical risk of
follow-up litigation by absent class members claiming inadequate
representation does not justify the much greater risk that the strict approach
would sound the death knell for the class action. Declining to certify class
actions to protect against this risk is, in the words of Tobias Barrington
Wolff (addressing a related issue), “abdication masquerading as
diligence.”237

233
See, e.g., City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 446 (3d Cir.
2017) (Fuentes, C.J., concurring) (observing that objective class criteria make preclusion decisions
regarding follow-up plaintiffs evident).
234
See supra note 205 and accompanying text (supporting the low incidence of fraudulent claims).
235
See supra notes 209–11 and accompanying text (examining safeguards).
236
Class action judgments are “presumptively entitled to full faith and credit,” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 374 (1996), so presumably the party challenging the judgment
has the burden of proof. Courts assess the strength of the arguments presented by the party seeking to
avoid the preclusive effect of the class action judgment, thereby suggesting that such party bears the
burden of proving inadequate representation. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249,
257 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in relevant part by an equally divided Court, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (accepting
the plaintiffs’ argument that a class action judgment may be collaterally attacked if the absentees were
not adequately represented); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1435–37 (2d Cir.
1993) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ allegations that they were not adequately represented in the initial class
action and that the class action settlement was collusive), overruled on other grounds by Syngenta Crop
Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002).
237
See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717,
743–45 (2005) (chastising courts for declining to certify class actions due to a “vague apprehension of
‘risk’” that a class action judgment awarding purely injunctive relief could preclude class members from
later pursuing individual claims for monetary relief).

2018]

ASCERTAINABILITY

731

As Part II demonstrates, the lower federal courts are deeply divided on
the nature, scope, and timing of the ascertainability requirement and the
policies that justify it.238 This division is of great practical significance as it
affects consumers’ access to justice and one of the few means of policing
corporate compliance with the law. When putative class representatives
cannot satisfy the ascertainability requirement, courts dismiss class actions,
thereby depriving the class of any opportunity for compensation and
eviscerating the only real hope for deterrence of wrongdoing.
This important policy debate has been conducted almost exclusively in
the lower federal courts, where a split among the circuits has resulted in
varying interpretations of a Federal Rule and concomitant differences in
outcomes. Part III of this article moves from policy to process, seeking to
identify the governmental actor bested suited to resolve this important policy
question and restore uniformity to the law governing class certification in
federal court.
III.

PROCESS: INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCIES

At least four governmental actors have authority to address the issue of
ascertainability: the United States Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, the United States Congress, and the lower federal courts.
Part III will analyze their relative institutional competencies and processes
and will consider the best process by which to resolve the policy issue
framed above.
A. United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court could address the ascertainability issue in one of
two ways: it could grant a petition for a writ of certiorari in a case that
presents the ascertainability issue and resolve the policy issue through
adjudication; or it could defer to the rule-making/amending process codified
in the Rules Enabling Act239 and wait to approve a Rule that emerges from
that process. Thus, the Supreme Court has a choice regarding the
“policymaking form”240 to deploy in resolving this issue. In exploring this
choice, let us begin by establishing the Court’s authority and competency to
resolve interpretive issues through adjudication. We will then consider the
factors that influence the Court’s decision to grant a petition for a writ of

238

See supra Parts II.A–B.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77.
240
See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1191 & n.9 (2012) (borrowing
the “choice of policymaking form” language from administrative law (citing M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency
Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1386–1403 (2004))).
239
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certiorari—which signals its determination to resolve a particular issue
through adjudication—and those that militate against such a grant.241
1. The Court’s Authority and Competency to Adjudicate
The Articles of Confederation did not authorize a national court system.
Since “[l]aws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their
true meaning and operation,”242 Article III of the United States Constitution
created a Supreme Court243 and Article I authorized Congress to “constitute
[federal] Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”244 Article III identified
the cases and controversies subject to federal judicial power and determined
those over which the Supreme Court has original and appellate jurisdiction
respectively (the latter being subject to such “Exceptions” and “Regulations
as the Congress shall make”).245 The United States Code grants the Court
significant discretion over its docket, authorizing it to review decisions of
the federal courts of appeals by writ of certiorari.246
The Court’s role as final interpreter of federal legislation is well
accepted. In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton stated, “[t]he
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts . . . . It . . . belongs to [the judges] to ascertain . . . [the] meaning of
any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.”247 In its
pathbreaking opinion in Marbury v. Madison,248 the Court not only asserted
the power of judicial review, but reiterated Hamilton’s view that “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret the rule.”249
Several attributes of the Supreme Court as an institution make it
particularly well suited to serve as final interpreter of federal law. If
authority to interpret the laws were vested in a branch or division of the
legislature (rather than in an independent Court), we could not expect “a
body which had even a partial agency in passing bad laws . . . to temper and
moderate them in the application.”250 Thus, the Court’s structural
independence from Congress helps secure an impartial and temperate
241
In subsequent sections of the article, infra Parts III.B–III.E, we will turn to other reasons why
the Court might decline to resolve a particular issue through adjudication, deferring to other lawmakers
with potentially greater institutional competency.
242
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
243
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
244
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
245
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1 & 2.
246
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
247
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
248
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
249
Id. at 177.
250
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
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251

interpretation of federal legislation.
The lifetime tenure and secure
compensation that the Constitution affords Article III judges252 further
ensures the Court’s independence from Congress and protects it from
political and financial pressures.253 Moreover, a single Court with final
authority to review interpretations of federal law by all of the federal courts
of appeals and the states’ highest courts fosters uniformity, which the
framers viewed as “indispensable.”254
The Constitution does not specify the number of Justices to be appointed
to the Court, and Congress has not focused on the Court’s efficacy in fixing
that number.255 Nevertheless, both the Court’s size and its deliberative
process increase the likelihood that it decides cases correctly.256 Affording a
group of Justices the opportunity to engage with one another enables them
to consider all available information and probe the strengths and weaknesses
of all arguments before rendering a judgment.257 A Court with multiple
Justices also permits greater demographic diversity, which may yield both
better decisions (by ensuring the Justices consider a diversity of different
viewpoints) and greater public confidence in those decisions.258

251
See F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 645, 651 (2009) (describing impartiality as “perhaps the most fundamental and least controversial
requirement of a successful Supreme Court”); see also Marcus, supra note 30, at 939 (“Life-tenured
judges can . . . counter dysfunctions in the political process that result in legislative underrepresentation
for various classes of minorities.” (footnote omitted)).
252
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that “[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office”).
253
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (positing that “permanency in office” is essential
to the independence of the judiciary, which “is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution”); see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (viewing independent judges as necessary to preclude
“the pestilential breath of [political] faction [from] poison[ing] the fountains of justice”); Hessick &
Jordan, supra note 251, at 654 (explaining that lifetime tenure and salary protection “permit judges to
resolve cases without being influenced by fear of reprisal from the parties, or by undue pressure from
external sources” (footnotes omitted)).
254
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id. (“[A]ll nations have found it
necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintendence and
authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice.”).
255
See Hessick & Jordan, supra note 251, at 646–47 (noting that when Congress has altered the
number of Justices, “the motivation was something other than a judgment about which size would be
best for the Supreme Court as an institution”).
256
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 97–98, 102
(1986) (positing that aggregation increases accuracy in adjudication and accepting as “reasonable” the
assumption that deliberation does as well).
257
Hessick & Jordan, supra note 251, at 649 (positing that “a larger Court might improve the
likelihood of reaching substantively correct decisions because additional Justices will increase the
information available for making decisions”); cf. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 256, at 102 (describing
three ways in which deliberation may affect the behavior of judges and conceding that the authors “have
not demonstrated that deliberation improves the accuracy of judicial decisions”).
258
Hessick & Jordan, supra note 251, at 655.
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In addition to these structural features of the Court designed to produce
impartial, uniform, and accurate interpretations of federal law, the individual
Justices themselves are selected and vetted to ensure they have the
education, “skill in the laws,” integrity, and judgment to master an everexpanding body of precedent and the analytical tools needed to interpret the
laws fairly and accurately.259
The Court’s structural features and the Justices’ individual
qualifications make the Supreme Court an appropriate institution to interpret
not only federal statutes, but also the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Federal Rules, like statutes, require a uniform and impartial interpretation
by a group relatively free from political and financial pressure. In subsequent
parts of the article, we will explore the debate about the proper approach the
Court should take in interpreting the Federal Rules, the extent to which it
should be guided (or bound) by the Advisory Committee notes, and the
circumstances in which it should defer to other potential lawmakers.260 For
present purposes, however, we accept the Court’s institutional competency
to interpret Federal Rules and consider its process for choosing which cases
to adjudicate.
2. Factors Influencing the Decision to Grant a Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari
The Court may be well suited to interpret federal statutes and Federal
Rules, but it cannot possibly hear appeals in all cases that present the
opportunity to do so. In choosing the cases in which to grant a petition for a
writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court views a split between or among the
federal courts of appeals as the single most important factor.261 Individual
Justices have identified this factor as a principal consideration in candid
conversations with researchers262 and judicial opinions frequently note the
salience of circuit splits in the certiorari calculus.263 Rule 10 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of the United States, too, notes that while “neither
259

See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (favoring an independent court with
knowledge of the laws acquired by “long and laborious study”).
260
See discussion, infra Parts III.B–III.E.
261
See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 246 (1994) (“Without a doubt, the single most important generalizable factor in assessing
certworthiness is the existence of a conflict or ‘split’ in the circuits.”); see also id. at 127, 217, 251 (noting
the importance of circuit splits in grants of certiorari).
262
Id. at 246–47 (quoting conversations with unnamed Justices).
263
E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1712 (2017); Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 137
S. Ct. 1504, 1508 (2017); Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 891–92 (2017); see also, e.g., Plumley
v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 828 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting the
different approaches taken by the courts of appeals and maintaining that the “Court should have granted
this petition to resolve the confusion”); Nunez v. United States, 554 U.S. 911, 913 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from a GVR (grant, vacate, and remand)) (“[T]he main purpose of our certiorari jurisdiction
[is] to eliminate circuit splits.”).
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controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion,” a conflict between
or among two or more of the courts of appeals “on the same important
matter” is of “the character of reasons the Court considers.”264
A circuit split often draws the Court’s attention because it “is a proxy
for or is indicative of other important criteria.”265 A conflict can arise only
if litigants present the same issue in two or more courts, suggesting its
importance––another salient factor in granting certiorari266––or at least its
prevalence; and the lower courts’ division on the issue suggests that the
answer is “not obvious.”267
While all of the Justices consider the presence of a conflict in deciding
whether to grant certiorari268 and while some would presumptively accept
cases presenting conflicts on important issues,269 the Court does not grant
certiorari in every case in which a conflict arises. After all, of the seven or
eight thousand petitions for writs of certiorari filed each year, the Court
grants petitions and hears oral argument in only about eighty cases––
approximately one percent.270 Thus, there is a presumption against a grant
of certiorari,271 even in cases in which a conflict exists.
In addition to the significant pressure imposed by the Court’s limited
capacity, there are other reasons why the Court declines to grant writs of
certiorari even in cases in which a split between or among the circuits exists
(or is alleged to exist). Five such reasons deserve consideration here. First,
it is not always easy to tell whether a circuit split actually exists.272 The
courts of appeals do not always announce when their decisions conflict with
the decision of another court, and counsel for petitioners have an incentive
to argue that a conflict exists, even if it is more apparent than real.273 Clerks
for the Justices labor to distinguish cases that appear to reach opposite
conclusions, citing differences in the facts of the cases that may explain the
different results, thereby avoiding a “square conflict.”274
Second, even where a genuine split exists, the Court will sometimes
refrain from accepting the case in the hope that “the conflict will work itself
264

SUP. CT. R. 10, 10(a).
PERRY, supra note 261, at 249.
266
See id. at 253 (noting that, in assessing the certworthiness of a case, Justices and clerks
considered “if there were a circuit conflict, and . . . if the conflict involved an important issue”).
267
Id. at 249.
268
Id.
269
See id. at 247 (noting that certain Justices view conflicts on important issues as “intolerable”).
270
Supreme Court of the U.S., FAQs––General Information, https://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/faq_general.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y5DU-MGX6] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018). The Court hears
fewer cases now than at any other time in recent history. Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining
the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1224 (2012).
271
PERRY, supra note 261, at 218.
272
See id. at 249 (“Determining whether or not a conflict exists is often subjective.”).
273
Id.
274
Id.
265
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out.” This is most frequently possible if the split is within a circuit because
the divided court of appeals can accept a case en banc and resolve its internal
conflict.276 Even where a split between or among two or more circuits exists,
the conflict may disappear if one of the courts accepts a case en banc and
changes its approach, bringing it into line with the other courts of appeals.277
Third, even where a genuine split exists and there is little hope that the
lower courts will resolve it, the Supreme Court may deny petitions for writs
of certiorari to permit further consideration by the lower federal courts and
others––an idea referred to as “percolation.”278 The Court puts off deciding
until “lower court judges, law professors in law reviews, or various other
commentators” have fleshed out the issues more fully, developing the
arguments and counter-arguments and identifying the consequences and
policy implications.279 Once the Supreme Court grants certiorari and decides
an issue, it will not take it up again for some time––it allows its own
decisions to percolate among the lower courts before taking up an issue
again––so the Court waits to accept an issue until it is “well-percolated.”280
Fourth, if Congress has expressed interest in legislating on an issue, the
Supreme Court may defer to the legislature on the theory that any
interpretative issue would be rendered moot if Congress were to act281 or
because Congress may have greater institutional competency to resolve the
particular issue.282
Finally, even if the Court declines to defer to Congress on a particular
issue, it may deny a petition if it believes that the rule-making process
envisioned by the Rules Enabling Act would be better suited for resolution
of the issue on which the lower courts have split.283
At first blush and in light of these considerations, it may seem surprising
that the Court has denied four petitions seeking review of the ascertainability

275

Id. at 233 (quoting an unnamed Justice).
Id.
277
Id. at 249–50.
278
See id. at 230 (“Justices like the smell of well-percolated cases. A case that has not percolated
through various courts will usually be considered uncertworthy.”).
279
Id. at 231; see also, e.g., Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 270 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court “should not rush to answer a novel question about the application of a
1-year-old decision in the absence of a pronounced conflict among the circuits”); Arizona v. Evans, 514
U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen frontier legal problems are presented, periods
of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts may yield a better
informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.”).
280
PERRY, supra note 261, at 230–31, 233.
281
See, e.g., Brief in Opposition at 29 n.20, ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. Briseno, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017)
(No. 16-1221) (suggesting that “[t]he Court should allow the legislative process to play out before
intervening” on the ascertainability issue).
282
See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing further the institutional competency of Congress).
283
See infra Parts III.C.2, III.E (detailing the origins of the Rules Enabling Act and the Court’s
occasional deference to the act).
276
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284

issue to date. After all, there is little doubt of the importance of the
ascertainability issue, given its critical role in the certification analysis, and
the petitions filed in recent years have all emphasized the circuit split.285
Several of the courts of appeals have commented upon the split in their
opinions,286 as have prominent commentators.287 In my judgment, the split
is real: the difference between the traditional approach, which requires a
discrete class defined by objective criteria, and the strict approach, which
requires proof of an administratively feasible means of ascertaining class
members at the time of certification, likely has a profound impact on both
trial courts’ decisions whether or not to certify a class and on plaintiffs’
decisions regarding choice of forum.288 Thus, it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court has declined to address ascertainability because the split is uncertain
or the issue unimportant.
While the Court initially may have declined to resolve the
ascertainability issue to permit further “percolation,” that explanation no
longer seems apt. Four years have passed since the Third Circuit decided
Carrera, during which the issue has been quite thoroughly analyzed. Eight
of the courts of appeals have addressed the issue since Carrera and
numerous law review articles have studied and critiqued these opinions and
the textual and policy arguments underlying them. The Supreme Court
284
ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. Briseno, 138 S. Ct. 313, 313 (Oct. 10, 2017) (Mem); Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Rikos, 136 S. Ct. 1493, 1493 (Mar. 28, 2016) (Mem); Direct Digital, Inc. v. Mullins, 136 S. Ct.
1161, 1162 (Feb. 29, 2016) (Mem); Martin v. Pac. Parking Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 962, 962 (Jan. 12, 2015)
(Mem).
285
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, 10, ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. Briseno, 138 S. Ct. 313
(2017) (No. 16-1221), 2017 WL 1353282 (describing the “disagreement” among the circuits as
“intolerable” and citing an “important circuit split”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29, Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Rikos, 136 S. Ct. 1493 (2015) (No. 15-835), 2015 WL 9591989 (citing a “deepening
circuit split regarding the generally accepted ‘ascertainability’ requirement”); Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 9, Direct Digital, LLC v. Mullins, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2015) (No. 15-549), 2015 WL 6549672
(citing an “established circuit conflict”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Martin v. Pac. Parking Sys.,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 962 (2014) (No. 14-486), 2014 WL 5463365 (maintaining that the “decision below
conflicts with . . . one or more other federal court of appeals decisions”).
286
See, e.g., In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 265 (2d Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed sub. nom
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. v. Universities Superannuation Scheme Ltd. (17-664) (Nov. 1, 2017) (declining
to follow the Third Circuit’s ascertainability approach and, instead, following the example of a number
of other circuits that disagree with the Third Circuit); Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121,
1127 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing the Third and Seventh Circuits’ divergent theories on ascertainability),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017); Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2015)
(disagreeing with the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability requirement), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1161 (2016); Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 161 n.4 (3d Cir. 2015) (detailing the circuit split on
this issue).
287
See, e.g., 1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 158, § 4:2 (describing the different approaches to
ascertainability adopted by the different courts of appeals); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 62, § 1760
(comparing the different ascertainability requirements of the Third and Seventh Circuits).
288
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19, 21, ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. Briseno (No. 16-1221)
(filed April 10, 2017), 2017 WL 1353282 (arguing that “certification decisions now turn on venue” and
“geography”).

738

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:3

recently declined yet another opportunity to take up the ascertainability issue
this term, when it denied the petition filed in Briseno, the Ninth Circuit
decision rejecting the strict approach.289 The need for further “percolation”
does not seem a powerful reason for declining to address the issue at this
time.
The three other reasons why the Court might decline to resolve a split in
the circuits—the hope that the lower federal courts themselves will work out
the conflict; deference to Congress; and deference to the rule-making
process—all suggest that another governmental actor may be better suited to
resolving the issue and therefore require closer examination. These reasons
will be taken up in the sections that follow.
B. The Lower Federal Courts
The Supreme Court may decline to accept a case raising an interpretive
issue of federal law on which the lower courts are split because it hopes the
conflict will “work itself out.”290 The questions addressed here are the
institutional competency of the lower federal courts, the efficacy and costs
of the en banc process they employ to resolve conflicts between or among
them, and the utility of deference to the lower courts specifically on the
ascertainability issue.
1. The Lower Courts’ Competency to Adjudicate
Like the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts have certain
institutional competencies that make them well suited to interpret federal
legislation and Rules. The lower federal courts are structurally separate from
Congress; like the Justices, the judges on the courts of appeals have lifetime
tenure and salary protection, which shield them from political and financial
pressures;291 and they are hand-selected by the President’s advisors,
appointed by the President, and vetted by the Senate to ensure they have the
education, skill, integrity, and judgment to interpret federal laws fairly and
accurately.292 While the courts of appeals sit in three-judge panels only a

289

Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313
(2017). Yet another petition for certiorari raising the ascertainability issue was recently filed, but a joint
motion to defer consideration of the petition was granted on January 16, 2018, in light of the parties’
settlement of the dispute. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. v. Universities
Superannuation Scheme Ltd. (No. 17-664) (U.S. 2017); see also Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. – Petrobas v.
Universities Superannuation Scheme Limited, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/petroleo-brasileiro-s-petrobras-v-universities-superannuation-scheme-limited/
[https://perma.cc/RBN7-YF6H] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
290
See supra notes 275–77 and accompanying text.
291
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also supra notes 252–54.
292
See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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293

third the size of the Supreme Court, the judges on each panel deliberate as
a group, which increases the likelihood that they will consider all available
information and debate the strengths and weaknesses of all arguments before
rendering judgment.294 By definition, these three-judge panels are more
diverse than single-judge courts and that diversity may yield better decisions
and greater public confidence in those decisions. Moreover, when the courts
of appeals sit en banc, the larger size of the en banc court should increase
the likelihood of well-informed, accurate, and fair decisions.295
Since the Supreme Court’s capacity to resolve splits between or among
the circuits is low given the tiny number of cases it hears each year, it makes
sense to defer to the lower federal courts if there is a reasonable likelihood
that they can agree upon a uniform interpretation of a federal statute or Rule
within a reasonable period of time. Because each of the courts of appeals is
bound to follow prior precedential panel decisions within the circuit unless
or until overruled by the court en banc (or reversed by the Supreme Court),296
however, en banc review is the only way the lower courts themselves can
eliminate a conflict once a split between or among them has emerged, as it
has regarding ascertainability.
2. Efficacy and Costs of En Banc Review Process
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, en banc review “is not
favored.”297 It may be granted only to “secure or maintain uniformity of the
court’s decisions” or to resolve “a question of exceptional importance”298
293
28 U.S.C. §§ 46(b)–(c). For a brief history of the courts of appeals and their practice of sitting
in three-judge panels, see, for example, 16AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3981.1, at 415–17 (4th ed. 2008); Alexandra Sadinsky, Redefining En Banc Review in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2007–09 (2014).
294
See supra notes 256–58 and accompanying text.
295
See supra notes 255–58 and accompanying text. Ordinarily when a circuit court sits en banc, all
of its judges participate; but courts with more than fifteen active judges may conduct en banc review by
a division of the court if so authorized by the courts’ own rules. FED. R. APP. P. 35(c) & Pub. L. 95-486,
§ 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (1978). To date, only the Ninth Circuit has formally adopted this option. See
Sadinsky, supra note 293, at 2014 n.119; 9th CIR. R. 35-3 (providing that “[t]he en banc court . . . shall
consist of the Chief Judge of this circuit and 10 additional judges to be drawn by lot from the active
judges of the Court”).
296
See, e.g., 16AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 293, § 3981.1, at 427 (noting that “[o]nly the court
sitting en banc can overrule the panel decision”).
297
FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
298
Id. at (1)–(2). Rule 35(b) further provides that a petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc must
state that either:
(A) the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the United States
Supreme Court or of the court to which the petition is addressed . . . and
consideration by the full court is therefore necessary to secure and maintain
uniformity of the court’s decisions; or
(B) the proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional
importance, each of which must be concisely stated; for example, a petition may
assert that a proceeding presents a question of exceptional importance if it
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and only if a “majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service
and who are not disqualified” assent.299 In order for a case to be heard or
reheard en banc, a party must file a petition seeking en banc review or a
judge on the court must request it;300 a judge on the court must call for a vote
on the petition or request;301 and a majority of the circuit judges in “regular
active service and who are not disqualified” must order it.302
Counsel file petitions for rehearing en banc as a matter of course, but
almost all such petitions are denied.303 In fact, en banc decisions make up
less than one percent of the regional courts of appeals’ decisions on the
merits,304 with that percentage declining in both absolute and relative terms
between 2000 and 2010.305 One of the reasons why courts disfavor the en
banc procedure is because it imposes significant costs—as much as five to
six times the judicial resources expended in a standard panel decision.306 For
example, all active judges, rather than only three, have to invest time and
energy in preparing and hearing the case and opinion-writing is more
time-consuming because more judges submit comments and suggestions,
which the author of the en banc opinion must seek to address.307 Even after
investing significant resources, it is possible that a majority of the full court

involves an issue on which the panel decision conflicts with the authoritative
decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the
issue.
FED. R. APP. P. 35(b)(1).
299
FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). Before the adoption of Appellate Rule 35 in 1967, both the Supreme Court
and Congress had approved the en banc procedure. See Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S.
326, 333–35 (1941); 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (codifying Textile Mills); W. Pac. R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R. Co., 345
U.S. 247 (1953) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)). Following the Court’s decision in Western Pacific, each
of the courts of appeals enacted its own rules governing the en banc procedure. Sadinsky, supra note 293,
at 2012.
300
FED. R. APP. P. 35(b); see also 16AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 293, § 3981.1, n.17 (stating
that Rule 35 does not affect the power of the court of appeals to initiate en banc hearings on its motion)
(citation omitted); W. Pac. R. Corp., 345 U.S. at 257 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) as granting the courts
of appeals authority to sit en banc and leaving it to the courts themselves “to establish the procedure for
the exercise of the power”).
301
FED. R. APP. P. 35(f).
302
FED. R. APP. P. 35(a); see Sadinsky, supra note 293, at 2013.
303
Sadinsky, supra note 293, at 2005, 2022 (footnotes omitted).
304
Id. at 2004 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 2015 (noting that only forty-five of more than
30,914 cases heard in 2010 by the circuit courts were heard en banc); FED’L BAR COUNCIL, EN BANC
PRACTICES IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT: TIME FOR A CHANGE? 4 (2011) [hereinafter Federal Bar Council
Report]; Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Decisionmaking, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29, 29–30, 41–
42, 45–46 (1988). The Federal Circuit hears a larger fraction of cases en banc. Sadinsky, supra note 293,
at 2016 (footnote omitted).
305
FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 304, at 5.
306
Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1008, 1020 (1991); see Sadinsky, supra note 293, at 2017–18.
307
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 306, at 1018.
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fails to reach a consensus; the case becomes moot; or the en banc court
agrees with the panel opinion in the end.310 Given these significant costs,
even if only one of the courts of appeals were out of sync with the others on
a particular issue, the odds that the “outlier” court would grant en banc
review, reconsider its position in light of the others’ decisions, and reach a
decision consistent with them, thereby obviating the need for Supreme Court
review, appear to be low.
If the courts of appeals were more evenly divided on an issue (or even
if just two of the courts of appeals reached a result at odds with the others),
then it would be even less likely that the lower courts would be able to work
out the conflict on their own within a reasonable period of time. Two (or
more) of the courts of appeals would have to be willing to hear or rehear
cases en banc, notwithstanding the costs described above, and would have
to be persuaded by the rationale of their sister courts. Since a court can
address an issue en banc only if it arises in a case before it, years might pass
before an “outlier” court had the opportunity to revisit an issue en banc.
Thus, the more outlier courts there were, the longer the process of “working
it out on their own” likely would take and the longer the split and the
resulting disuniformity in the interpretation of a federal statute or rule would
persist.311
Given the significant costs imposed by full en banc review, some of the
courts of appeals employ an informal en banc review process, whereby a
panel circulates to the full court a proposed opinion that would overrule a
prior panel decision, seeking the full court’s acquiescence or affirmative
approval of the opinion before it is published.312 Only the Seventh and D.C.
Circuits have adopted formal rules authorizing such a process,313 but seven
other federal courts of appeals employ some type of informal en banc
procedure.314 Notable for our purposes, the Third Circuit has expressly
disavowed an informal en banc review procedure in its local rules, barring

308

Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1020.
310
Id.
311
For these reasons, even if the Third Circuit were to “reverse itself en banc in some future case”
regarding ascertainability, Klonoff, supra note 37, at 1607, that action alone would not resolve the
disuniformity among the courts of appeals on this issue.
312
Sadinsky, supra note 293, at 2024–29.
313
Id. at 2025; see 7th CIR. R. 40(e); D.C. Circuit Policy Statement on En Banc Endorsement of
Panel Decisions (Jan. 17, 1996), https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL%20%20RPP%20-%20Irons%20Footnote/$FILE/IRONS.PDF [https://perma.cc/4QLH-LJVM].
314
Sadinsky, supra note 293, at 2025 (citing Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Stealth
Procedures and the Erosion of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
713, 726–27 (2009)).
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panels of the court from overruling prior precedential panel opinions and
relying exclusively on the formal en banc procedure to achieve that result.315
3. Utility of Deference to the Lower Federal Courts on the Issue of
Ascertainability
With the lower federal courts’ competency to interpret federal statutes
and Rules established and the efficacy and costs of the en banc review
process in mind, we now consider whether it makes sense for the Supreme
Court to decline to grant certiorari, deferring instead to the lower federal
courts to resolve the ascertainability issue on their own. Given the nature of
the split—with the Third and Eleventh Circuits adopting the strict approach
in 2013 and 2015, respectively (and with the Sixth Circuit appearing to align
with them in 2017);316 and the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits rejecting
that approach in the months and years that followed (with the Fifth317 and
Eighth318 Circuits likely aligned with them)—at least two of the courts of
appeals would have to reconsider their approach in order to resolve the split
without Supreme Court intervention.
It is difficult to gauge the likelihood that they will do so and if so, in
what period of time. A local Third Circuit rule cautions that en banc review

315
See id. at 2025 n.220 (“It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel in a precedential
opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a
precedential opinion of a previous panel. Court en banc consideration is required to do so.” (quoting 3D
CIR. I.O.P. 9.1)).
316
While the Sixth Circuit appeared to reject the strict approach in 2012 in Young v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 539–41 (6th Cir. 2012), its more recent decision in Sandusky Wellness
Center, LLC v. ASD Specialty Healthcare, Inc., 863 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 2017) is more sympathetic to the
strict approach, rejecting “sole reliance on individual affidavits.” Id. at 466.
317
While the Fifth Circuit has long required that the class be “‘adequately defined and clearly
ascertainable,’” see Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam)), in a far more recent
(but nonprecedential and unpublished) opinion, it has stated that “‘the court need not know the identity
of each class member before certification; ascertainability requires only that the court be able to identify
class members at some stage of the proceeding.’” Frey v. First Nat’l Bank, 602 Fed. Appx. 164, 168 (5th
Cir. 2015) (quoting 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 3:3) (emphasis added); see also id. at 169 (appearing
willing to accept class members’ (potentially self-serving) statements that their accounts were personal,
rather than business). It also has concluded that “the possibility that some [claimants] may fail to prevail
on their individual claims will not defeat class membership on the basis of the ascertainability
requirement.” In re Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d 1003, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 821 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal citation,
footnote, and quotation marks omitted).
318
See Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC, v. MedTox Scientific, Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 996–97 (8th Cir.
2016) (declining to impose a “separate, preliminary [ascertainability] requirement,” but adhering to its
prior understanding that Rule 23 requires the class to be “adequately defined and clearly ascertainable”;
accepting fax logs as “objective criteria that make the recipient clearly ascertainable”); Ihrke v. N. States
Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 573 n.3 (8th Cir. 1972) (requiring that the class “be adequately defined and
clearly ascertainable”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815
(1972).
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“is not favored” and urges counsel to exercise “restraint” in seeking it. 319
The Third Circuit denied a petition seeking en banc review of its strict
approach in Carrera,320 notwithstanding some of its judges asking “how far
we go in requiring plaintiffs to prove [the ability to identify class members]
at the outset . . . .”321 While the Third Circuit has walked its position back a
bit in subsequent decisions,322 it continues to require “evidentiary support”
that an “economical and administratively feasible” means of identifying the
class members “will be successful” as an “essential prerequisite” to class
certification323 and to reject affidavits alone as sufficient proof of
ascertainability.324 Under its own rules, no panel opinion can overrule
Carrera and no informal en banc procedure is authorized.325
In the nearly three years since the Seventh Circuit rejected the
heightened ascertainability approach in mid-2015,326 no party has sought en
banc review of the issue in either the Third or Eleventh Circuits.327 Whether
both of these courts will reconsider the strict approach in light of the growing
number of courts of appeals rejecting it is unknown; but the opportunity to
petition for en banc review of the Third Circuit’s most recent ascertainability
319

3D CIR. R. 35.4.
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12–2621, 2014 WL 3887938 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (denying petition
for rehearing by the panel and rehearing en banc).
321
Id. at *1 (Ambro, C.J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc; joined
by Judges McKee, Rendell, and Fuentes) (maintaining that the issue “merits not only en banc review . . .
but also review by the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure”); see also
id. at *2 (positing that “Carrera goes too far”).
322
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Third Circuit’s modest adjustments to the strict approach
after Carrera).
323
In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380, 396 (3d Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1167 (2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Byrd v.
Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015).
324
See City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2017)
(quoting Byrd, 784 F.3d at 171) (“[A]ffidavits from potential class members, standing alone, without
‘records to identify class members or a method to weed out unreliable affidavits,’ will not constitute a
reliable and administratively feasible means of determining class membership.”).
325
See supra text accompanying note 315 (explaining that the Third Circuit relies “exclusively” on
the formal en banc procedure and disallows “panels of the court from overruling precedential panel
opinions”).
326
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161
(2016).
327
A petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was sought in In re Community Bank of Northern
Virginia Lending Practices Litigation, 795 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1167 (2016),
but the petition did not seek review of the court’s ascertainability approach. See Petition for Rehearing
and Rehearing En Banc by Appellant at iii, 1–2, In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices
Litig., 795 F.3d 380 (3d. Cir. 2015) (No. 13–4273) (opposing the panel’s decision to treat Rule 23 as a
pleading standard and to ignore class certification issues, but declining to address ascertainability). In all
events, it was denied on October 5, 2015. Sur Petition for Rehearing, In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg.
Lending Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380 (3d. Cir. 2015) (No. 13–4273). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit denied
en banc review in its most recent ascertainability decision, in which it appeared to align with the Third
and Eleventh Circuits. See Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. ASD Specialty Healthcare Inc., 863 F.3d
460, 460 (6th Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing en banc on September 1, 2017).
320
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328

opinion has passed.
The split among the circuits and the resulting
disuniformity in the interpretation of Rule 23 remain, inviting
forum-shopping and threatening inequitable administration of the laws. In
light of the significant costs that en banc review entails; the small number of
cases heard en banc; and the need for at least two courts of appeals not only
to grant en banc review but to reject their panel courts’ opinions on the
issue,329 one may question whether it continues to make sense for the Court
to defer to the lower courts to resolve the ascertainability issue.
C. Congress
Since it may no longer make sense to defer to the lower federal courts
on the ascertainability issue, we should examine other possible reasons the
Supreme Court may have for declining to grant a writ of certiorari to resolve
it. As suggested above, the Court sometimes defers to Congress rather than
granting certiorari either because Congress has greater institutional
competency to resolve the issue or because Congress has expressed interest
in legislating on it and the interpretative issue presented for the Court’s
consideration would be mooted if Congress were to act.330 In this Section,
we consider Congress’s unique competency to make law, its authority to
craft procedural rules governing the federal courts, its decision to delegate
most of that authority to the judiciary, and its nascent efforts to address the
ascertainability issue.
1. Congress’s Competency to Make Law and Authority to Craft
Procedural Rules
If the Court’s principal role in our system of divided government is to
interpret the law, then Congress’s role is to enact it. The very first section of
Article I of the Constitution vests “all legislative Powers” granted by the
Constitution to “a Congress of the United States . . . .”331 Congress is
uniquely well suited to resolve the most pressing public policy issues of the
day for several reasons.
First, our Senators and Representatives, elected in popular democratic
elections, are politically accountable to the people. The Constitution
guarantees each state a voice in the Senate while providing the people with
328
The Third Circuit decided City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of North America Inc., 867
F.3d 434, 434 (3d Cir. 2017) on August 16, 2017. Under Federal Appellate Rules, a petition for rehearing
en banc would have had to have been filed within fourteen days of the judgment, or by August 30, 2017.
See FED. R. APP. P. 35(c), 40(a)(1) (explaining the fourteen-day deadline). As of January 27, 2018, the
docket revealed no filings after entry of the judgment and issuance of the mandate.
329
See supra Part III.B.2 (explaining the high costs and low incidence of en banc review).
330
See, e.g., Brief in Opposition, at 29 n.20, ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. Briseno, No. 16–1221 (U.S.
June 16, 2017) (suggesting that “[t]he Court should allow the legislative process to play out before
intervening” on the ascertainability issue).
331
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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332

proportional representation in the House; the frequent elections of the
Representatives ensures their “immediate dependence” upon and “intimate
sympathy with the people” in their local communities.333 Americans accept
the legitimacy of federal legislation because they choose the lawmakers who
enact it.334
Second, the significant size of and geographical diversity within the
House of Representatives and Senate ensure other types of
diversity—lawmakers of different religions, races, ethnicities, national
origins, and sexual orientations, from big cities and big sky country,335
ensuring greater public acceptance of the laws they enact.336
Third, Congress has the tools to gather information needed to make wellinformed decisions—lawmakers can hold town hall meetings in their home
states and issue subpoenas and conduct hearings in Washington.337
Finally, Congress is a deliberative body, which debates issues in
committee and on the floor, ensuring that all views are aired and the
strengths and weaknesses of proposed legislative solutions are considered.
These strengths enable Congress to serve as the “forge and anvil of major
public policy.”338
Congress has many powers in addition to the law-making power,
including the authority to create new governmental units, as needed.339 Most
notably, Congress has power, granted by Article I of the Constitution, “[t]o
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,”340 which it exercised by
creating the federal district courts and the courts of appeals341 and vesting
them with some of the jurisdiction that Article III of the Constitution
332

U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison).
334
See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 371 (2d ed. 2002) (“[C]onsent and
approbation are achieved through delegating lawmaking power to legislatures that consist of popularly
elected representatives.”).
335
Big sky country refers to areas of flat, open land. Big sky, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/big_sky [https://perma.cc/8TFN-J5E9] (last visited Feb.
11, 2018).
336
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (discussing the different factions and classes in
America and explaining that the “great[] number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought
within the compass of republican . . . government” allows for greater diversity to prevent a majority from
“invad[ing] the rights of other citizens”).
337
See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161, 174 (1927) (holding that “the power of
inquiry,” or in other words, the power to investigate and hold hearings, is an “essential and appropriate”
use of legislative power).
338
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 700 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
339
See id. at 697–702 (describing the “major tasks” of the legislature, including constructing new
governmental structures to manage new problems and needs).
340
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United
States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.”).
341
28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 43, 132(a) (2012).
333

746

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:3

342

allows. While the authority to create the lower federal courts logically
includes the authority to determine the procedures followed by those courts
and attorneys practicing before them,343 in 1934 Congress delegated most of
this authority to the judiciary, drawing a “sharp distinction between
substance and procedure” and deferring to the judiciary on procedural
matters.344
2. Congress’s Delegation in the Rules Enabling Act
Before Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act in 1934 (the REA or
the Act),345 procedure in the lower federal courts had to “conform as near as
may be” to the procedure in the state court in which each federal court sat,346
resulting in “confusion” that made practice in the federal district courts “the
most difficult and uncertain of the whole civilized world.”347 The REA
model sought to eliminate that confusion by providing for centralized and
uniform rules crafted by the judiciary.348
In adopting the REA and largely delegating responsibility over
procedure to the judiciary, Congress hoped that procedural rules drafted by
the courts would foster uniformity, simplicity, efficiency, and resolution of
disputes on the merits, rather than on procedural technicalities.349 Congress
reserved to itself exclusive authority to legislate on “what the courts may
do,” while delegating to the judiciary the authority to determine “how [the
courts] shall do it.”350
342

U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941) (“Congress has undoubted power to
regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
344
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1202–03.
345
See Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–415, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (giving the Supreme Court
of the United States authority to adopt rules to govern actions at law) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (2012) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure . . . for cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals.”)). While the initial
session law did not have an official name, the act is known as the Rules Enabling Act. See, e.g., Stephen
B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1023 n.33 (1982) (identifying the
session law, an Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–415, 48 Stat. 1064, as the Rules Enabling Act).
346
See Act of June 1, 1872, 17 Stat. 197, § 5 (providing that the practices and pleadings, except in
equity, in the United States courts conform to those of state court) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
724 (1934)) (repealed 1940).
347
S. REP. NO. 69–1174, at 2 (1926).
348
See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 892–94 (1999) [hereinafter Bone, The Process]
(identifying centralization and national uniformity as key elements for court-made rules).
349
See S. REP. NO. 69–1174, at 1–2, 6; see also id. at 12–13 (identifying a more complete list of
intended benefits).
350
Id. at 12; see also Burbank, supra note 345, at 1052 (explaining that the REA allowed the Court
to determine the “detailed machinery,” but allowed Congress to retain control over “all fundamental and
jurisdictional matters” (quoting Reforms in Judicial Procedure, American Bar Association Bills, Part 2:
Hearing on H.R. 133 and H.R. 4545 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 63d Cong. 22–23 (1914)
(statement of Thomas Shelton))); Anthony Vitarelli, Comment, A Blueprint for Applying the Rules
Enabling Act’s Supersession Clause, 117 YALE L.J. 1225, 1231 (2008) (summarizing the legislative
343
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Proponents of the REA model assumed a sharp distinction between
substance and procedure, viewing procedure as subordinate to substantive
policy and law and instrumental in function.351 While changes in public
policy demanded a democratic process, the adoption of procedural rules did
not because, in the words of Professor Robert Bone, procedure was then
believed to “involve[] no substantive value choices.”352 To ensure that the
judiciary did not overstep its bounds and intrude upon Congress’s authority
to enact substantive law, the REA barred the Rules from “abridg[ing],
enlarg[ing], [o]r modify[ing] the substantive rights of any litigant.”353
In delegating responsibility to the judiciary to craft rules governing
practice in the district courts, Congress viewed the courts as better suited to
the task given their expertise in the “science of procedure” and their hands’
on experience with judicial administration.354 A 1926 report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee acknowledged:
A legislative body immersed in questions of broad public
policy only remotely related to the details of court procedure
is ill adapted to the framing of court rules. On the other hand,
judges daily engaged in administering justice ought to be
equipped to determine the means by which that administration
may be facilitated.355
Another institutional advantage was that the federal courts were
protected from political pressure and special interests and therefore were
better able than Congress to assume the rule-making responsibility.356
Because the rule-making task was perceived to involve “reasoned
deliberation rather than interest accommodation,” the lack of political
accountability on the part of those crafting the rules did not seriously
undermine the legitimacy of the process or its product.357
history of the REA and the debate about “comparative institutional competence” between the Court and
Congress).
351
Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 894–97; Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1202–
03.
352
Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 896.
353
Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–415, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (giving the Supreme Court of the
United States authority to adopt rules to govern actions at law) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(2012)); see also Burbank, supra note 345, at 1025–26, 1036, 1106–07 (discussing the legislative history
of the REA and the allocation of power between Congress and the Court).
354
Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 896; see also, e.g., Vitarelli, supra note 350, at 1231
(“When Congress passed the REA, it delegated some of its powers to the Supreme Court in recognition
of the judiciary’s superior competence in establishing rules of procedure.”); see generally Burbank, supra
note 345 (describing the legislative history of the REA).
355
S. REP. NO. 69–1174, at 7 (1926).
356
Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 896 (footnote omitted); see also supra text accompanying
notes 252–54 (discussing the lifetime tenure and secure compensation of federal judges as further
protection against the political pressure).
357
Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 899.
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While reserving to Congress the right to revise the Rules crafted by the
Court or to withdraw the delegation of power to it altogether, the
1926 Senate report suggested that the “rules [would] stand without
amendment” by Congress because “it is convenient for the legislature to
refer proposed changes to the courts[, which are] better equipped to consider
them.”358 Congress never vetoed a Rule from 1934 to 1973.359
During the 1950s and 1960s, concerns about the legitimacy of the
rule-making process were occasionally voiced by those who recognized that
substance and procedure are “inextricably intertwined” and that procedural
rules have “important substantive effects,” but these critiques were mild and
few questioned that courts should retain primary responsibility for
rule-making.360 With the rise of the civil rights movement and the advent of
structural reform litigation in the 1960s and 1970s, however, the utility of
litigation to achieve substantive policy ends became more obvious, as did
the blurriness of the substance/procedure divide and the profound impact of
procedural rules on substantive outcomes.361
Over time, and with pressure mounting on several different fronts, critics
challenged the judicial rule-making model—with its emphasis on expertise
and insulation from political pressure—advocating instead a process that
valued representation and accommodated competing interest groups.362 The
critics argued, in the 1970s and 1980s, that if practicing attorneys and
representatives of interest groups were more involved in the rule-making
process, the process would gain legitimacy and produce better rules.363 As
interest groups claimed a more active role—by participating in hearings
before the Advisory Committee and lobbying Congress to veto proposed
rule changes—Congress amended the REA in 1988 by adopting the Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 (the JIA) to open up the
rule-making process in a number of ways.364 The JIA codified the role of the
358

See S. REP. NO. 69–1174, at 7 (1926) (citing experience with the Supreme Court’s rules
governing equity, admiralty, and bankruptcy cases; experience in states that have delegated rule-making
power to their courts; and experience in England).
359
Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 893 (citation omitted).
360
Id. at 899 (citation omitted).
361
See id. at 900 (“The resulting changes in the character of federal litigation gave rise to concerns
about the adequacy of the existing procedural system to promote substantive values.”); Martin H. Redish
& Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the Federal
Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1325–26 (2006) (describing
the potential political nature and impact of many of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
362
See Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 902, 904; Marcus, supra note 30, at 947, 949
(discussing “deliberative democracy” and “deliberative democratic pedigree”).
363
See Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 904 (noting that the rule-making process did not have
public participation).
364
Judicial Improvements & Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100–702, §§ 401–07, 102 Stat.
4642, 4648–52 (1988); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100–889, at 26–27 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5986–87 [hereinafter 1988 House Report] (noting that before the 1988 amendment,
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Advisory Committees and mandated that they include lower court judges,
appellate court judges, and practitioners.365 More importantly, to enhance
transparency and public participation in the rule-making process, the JIA
required the Advisory Committees to conduct their business in meetings
open to the public (with limited exceptions); to provide advance notice of
their meetings; to publish the minutes of their meetings; and to provide
longer periods for public comment on proposed rule changes.366 Congress
also contemplated a greater role for itself by granting a longer window—a
full seven months—in which to modify or veto a rule proposed by the
Court.367 In doing so, Congress “contemplate[d] an arguably increased
measure of congressional involvement in the rule revision process.”368
Congress’s enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (the
CJRA),369 which required each federal district court to create a plan to reduce
expense and delay, further disrupted the original centralized, expert judicial
rule-making model in a number of ways.370 First, the CJRA invited the
proliferation of local rules, which threatened uniformity in federal civil

“Congress . . . frequently intervened either to delay the effective date of, disapprove, or modify rules and
amendments promulgated under the Rules Enabling Acts”).
365
Judicial Improvements & Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100–702, § 401, 102 Stat. 4642,
4649 (1988) (adding 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2)); see also, e.g., Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at
1200 (noting that the 1988 Act mandates Advisory Committees composed of practitioners, trial judges,
and appellate judges); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1109–10, 1136–37 (2002). At least since the mid-1980s,
critics have advocated inclusion on the Advisory Committee of more practicing attorneys and
representatives of user groups to foster greater representation. Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 903.
The current Advisory Committee includes not only federal district court judges, but also a federal
bankruptcy judge, a court of appeals judge, a state supreme court justice, an attorney with the United
States Department of Justice, private practitioners, academics who study and teach civil procedure, a
clerk of a federal district court, and the secretary to the Standing Committee. See Membership of the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and Advisory Rules Committees, Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules (Oct. 1, 2016).
366
Judicial Improvements & Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100–702, § 401, 102 Stat. 4642,
4649 (1988) (adding 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)); see also, e.g., Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 903;
Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1062–63 (1993); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory
Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 830, 832 (1991) [hereinafter
Mullenix, Hope Over Experience]; Procedures for the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure and Its Advisory Rules Committees (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/laws-and-procedures-governingwork-rules-committees [https://perma.cc/G7JN-7245]; Struve, supra note 365, at 1110–12.
367
Judicial Improvements & Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100–702, § 401, 102 Stat. 4642,
4649–50 (1988) (adding 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a)); see also Carl Tobias, Congress and the 2000 Federal
Civil Rules Amendments, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 75, 85 (2000).
368
Tobias, supra note 367, at 85; see also Struve, supra note 365, at 1115, 1119 (noting that
Congress must receive both the text of the proposed Rule and the Advisory Committee note).
369
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82).
370
Id. at 5090.
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371

procedure. Second, the philosophy underlying the CJRA—that concern
for unique local circumstances and involvement by local user groups would
yield better rules and achieve greater legitimacy—was inconsistent with the
philosophy underlying the original Federal Rules.372 And third—perhaps
most relevant—by enacting the CJRA, Congress evinced the view that
procedural reform was a matter of legislative concern. As Professor Bone
explained, “CJRA proponents defended congressional involvement by
arguing that CJRA reforms were so intimately tied to substantive policies
and effects that public participation and congressional control were
essential.”373 In other words, access to the courts and their efficient operation
were matters of concern to Congress, which could threaten judicial control
over rule-making.374
Congress has flexed its muscle and decided several matters of judicial
procedure in the years since it enacted the CJRA.375 In 1995, Congress
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act376 to discourage the
filing of, and reduce the costs of defending, abusive private securities
lawsuits designed to extract settlements from nonculpable issuers of
securities and others, including their accountants and underwriters.377 The
legislation altered the procedures governing private securities litigation by
imposing heightened pleading requirements378 and a stay of discovery
during the pendency of motions to dismiss;379 establishing new procedures
for the appointment of lead plaintiffs and lead counsel in securities class
actions, including a presumption that the person with the “largest financial
interest in the relief sought by the class” is the “most adequate plaintiff”;380
limiting attorneys’ fees and expenses to a “reasonable percentage of the
amount actually paid to the class”;381 and making sanctions for violations of
371
See Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 904–05 (identifying critics’ concerns for balkanization
and fragmentation of federal civil procedure).
372
See id. at 905 (“[T]he idea of fitting rules to local circumstances and involving user groups
centrally in the drafting process would have made little sense [to the drafters of the original Federal
Rules].”).
373
Id. (citing Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV.
375, 432–34, 436–38 (1992) [hereinafter Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation]).
374
Id.; see also Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation, supra note 373, at 429.
375
Although Congress did not veto proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
on discovery in 1993, the ABA and other interest groups lobbied Congress heavily and “almost succeeded
in securing a congressional veto.” Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 906.
376
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
377
See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104–369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730
(“[S]eek[ing] to return securities litigation to [a] high standard.”).
378
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, supra note 376, at 738, 743, 747 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(2)(A), 78u-4(a)(2), 78u-4(b)).
379
Id. at 741, 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b)(3)(B)).
380
Id. at 738–40, 743–45 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)).
381
Id. at 740, 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(6), 78u-4(a)(6)).
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Rule 11(b) in private securities litigation mandatory. While the House’s
repeated efforts to amend Rule 11 to eliminate the safe harbor period and to
make sanctions mandatory beyond the securities context383 have not
garnered support in the Senate,384 Congress enacted the Class Action
Fairness Act in 2005, making significant changes in class action practice
beyond the securities context by greatly expanding the federal courts’
jurisdiction to entertain class actions and requiring greater scrutiny of class
action settlements.385 These Congressional forays into judicial procedure
raised the Advisory Committee’s awareness of the threat of congressional
involvement and the need to accommodate interests groups to avoid that
threat.386
This brief review of Congress’s competency to make law and its
authority to regulate judicial procedure suggests three tentative conclusions.
First, while Congress has greater institutional competence to resolve major
public policy questions, the Supreme Court and the Advisory Committee
have training in the law and greater experience with federal court practice,387
which may make them better qualified to address many issues of judicial
procedure and administration. Second, Congress is a highly political body,
subject to lobbying and other forms of political pressure, while the Court
and the rule-making committees are largely made up of judges and
academics with lifetime tenure, who are insulated from much of that
pressure and theoretically have greater concern for the “integrity of the
procedural system as a whole.”388 Third, Congress’s principal comparative
advantage in the rulemaking arena “stems from its greater democratic
legitimacy.”389 Given our current recognition of the significant political
382

Id. at 742, 748 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(c)(2), 78u-4(c)(2)).
H.R. 720, 115th Cong. (2017) (passed Mar. 10, 2017); H.R. 758, 114th Cong. (2015) (passed
Sept. 17, 2015).
384
See S. 237, 115th Cong. (2017) (introduced on Jan. 30, 2017, and hearings held by Senate
Judiciary Committee on Nov. 8, 2017, but not passed); S. 401, 114th Cong. (2015) (introduced on Feb.
5, 2015, but not passed).
385
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15).
386
See Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 906 & n.110 (citing minutes of Advisory Committee
meetings that reflect awareness of the potential for congressional interference).
387
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 884 (2010) [hereinafter Bone, A Comment] (explaining the
advantages to the formal rulemaking process; stating that the rulemaking committee “has experience with
and expertise in federal civil procedure”); Tobias, supra note 367, at 87 (discussing the “better
institutional memory, broader expertise, greater appreciation of the relevant issues, and more resources
to commit to the rule amendment than Congress has”); Vitarelli, supra note 350, at 1231 (analyzing the
features of the Supreme Court that make it a more apt rule-maker than Congress).
388
Bone, A Comment, supra note 387, at 884; see also Marcus, supra note 30, at 939 (stating that,
“[l]ife-tenured judges can use the canons to counter dysfunctions in the political process”).
389
Vitarelli, supra note 350, at 1231–32 (citing Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 907); see
also Moore, supra note 366, at 1066 (discussing dissents by Justices Black and Douglas from the Court’s
383
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impact of the Civil Rules in general and the enormous impact the strict
approach to ascertainability has on consumer class actions in particular,
Congress’s claim to greater democratic legitimacy should not be
underestimated. On the other hand, when Congress legislates on discrete
procedural issues (like ascertainability) in response to lobbying by political
interest groups, it may disregard or devalue the needs of the procedural
system as a whole.390
1. Congress’s Efforts to Address Ascertainability
While the Court has declined repeated opportunities to address the
ascertainability issue, the House of Representatives has passed a bill, called
the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, which, among other
changes, would codify the strict approach to ascertainability by barring
certification of:
a class action seeking monetary relief unless the class is
defined with reference to objective criteria and the party
seeking to maintain such a class action affirmatively
demonstrates that there is a reliable and administratively
feasible mechanism (a) for the court to determine whether
putative class members fall within the class definition and (b)
for distributing directly to a substantial majority of class
members any monetary relief secured for the class.391
To date, the Senate has not taken up the proposed legislation.392
In passing the bill, the House described the overarching problem as
“overbroad class actions” that disadvantage American companies competing
in a global market, “force[ American consumers] into lawsuits they do not
want to be in,” and result in higher prices for consumer goods.393 In
approval of proposed Rule amendments, which they maintained substantially affected litigants’ rights
and should have been resolved through legislation by Congress).
390
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989
DUKE L.J. 281, 282 (suggesting that “complex technical issues of judicial practice cannot sustain
attention through the political process”); Moore, supra note 366, at 1057, 1059 (describing Congress’s
direct amendment of Rule 35 as “unnecessarily and improperly propell[ing] the legislative branch into a
new role as a ‘quick fix’ for drawbacks of the Rules perceived by interested persons or groups,” and
expressing concern that Congress “is reacting on occasion to isolated pressures and is not acting with a
vision of the procedural system as a whole” (footnote omitted)).
391
Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017,
H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 103 (2017) (emphasis added) (adding, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 1718(a)) (passed
in the House on Mar. 9, 2017).
392
The bill was received in the Senate and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on March
13, 2017. No further action is listed on congress.gov. See H.R.985 - Fairness in Class Action Litigation
and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/115th-congress/house-bill/985 [https://perma.cc/483R-MBA7] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
393
H.R. REP. NO. 115-25, at 2, 4 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 House Report]; see also id. at 3 (stating
that “[t]he fundamental problem is that far too many class actions and mass actions are initiated by
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explaining the specific section that would codify the strict approach, the
House Report stated that “the whole purpose of class actions is to redress the
injuries sustained by class members” so “the system should ensure that any
benefits obtained in such cases can actually be delivered to those class
members.”394 Thus, class counsel should be required to demonstrate that the
class action “would actually serve the purpose of compensating class
members for their alleged injuries.”395
Bemoaning the circuit split on ascertainability, the House bill aims to
establish “a rule that ensures class actions are used only where they will
serve to actually get compensation to class members, where deserved.”396
By focusing exclusively on compensation, however, the House Report
ignores the deterrent effect of class action litigation; and by requiring a
mechanism for distributing the recovery to “a substantial majority of the
class members,”397 the House bill risks denying compensation to any class
member.398
A section of the House Report containing the “Dissenting Views” of
sixteen House Judiciary Committee members openly asserted that the bill
“aims to eliminate the use of class actions.”399 Not only did the dissenters
challenge the proposed bill’s ends, but also its means: “the bill
would . . . unnecessarily circumvent the careful and thorough Rules Enabling
Act process for amending Federal civil procedure rules.”400 The dissent
from the House Report quoted a letter submitted by the Chair of the Judicial
Conference’s Standing Committee and the Chair of the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules to the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, which
“‘strongly urge[d] Congress not to amend the class action procedures found
in Rule 23 outside the Rules Enabling Act Process’” and “‘ask[ed] that
changes be entrusted to the proven and well-established procedures of the
Act, rather than direct legislation.’”401 The letter expressed concern that if
opportunistic lawyers, and litigated primarily for the benefit of those lawyers, with any actual victims
being used as a means of garnering vast fee awards”).
394
Id. at 19.
395
Id.
396
Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
397
H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 103 (2017) (emphasis added).
398
In many class actions, it is impossible to distribute the entire recovery or settlement fund, and
requiring a plan for distribution to a substantial majority of class members as a certification requirement
may doom many class actions. See, e.g., Wasserman, Cy Pres, supra note 171, at 103–05 (explaining
why settlement funds often go unclaimed).
399
2017 House Report, supra note 393, at 45 (Dissenting Views); see also id. at 46 (citing the bill’s
“impossible-to-meet certification . . . requirements”).
400
Id. at 46 (Dissenting Views) (footnote omitted).
401
Id. (Dissenting Views) (quoting Letter from the Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair of the Judicial
Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and the Hon. John D. Bates, Chair of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to the Hon. Bob Goodlatte, Chair of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, at 3 (Feb. 14, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/federal-rules-committee-letter1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GH4-5UEA] [hereinafter Judicial Conference Letter]); see also Draft Minutes
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the legislation passed by the House were enacted into law, it would shortcircuit the REA’s deliberative process.402
It is a challenge to determine the likelihood that the legislation will pass.
GovTrack gives it only a thirty-six percent chance of passage.403 Given the
gridlock and dysfunction in Congress and the long list of pressing issues on
its plate—the debt ceiling, infrastructure, immigration reform, and health
care—even these odds seem high. While it is possible that the Supreme
Court has declined to take up the ascertainability issue because it believes
that Congress has greater institutional competency to address it, or because
legislation would moot any effort by the Court to resolve the issue through
adjudication, it is at least as likely that the Court has deferred to the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules.
D. Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
As suggested in Part III.A above, the Supreme Court has a choice of
policy-making forms to deploy in resolving procedural questions like
ascertainability: it may resolve them through adjudication—by granting a
petition for a writ of certiorari in a case that raises the issue and deciding the
case—or it may defer to the rule-making/amending process codified in the
REA and wait to approve a Rule or amendment that emerges from that
process.404 Several lower court judges who have addressed ascertainability
without guidance from either the Court or the Advisory Committee have
urged the Committee to take up the issue.405 In this Section, we explore the
Advisory Committee’s institutional competency and its efforts to date to
address the ascertainability issue.

of April 25, 2017, Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules at 2, in JUNE 2017 AGENDA BOOK,
supra note 203, at 596, tab 4B (identifying letters submitted to Congressional leaders “describing the
importance of relying on the Rules Enabling Act to address matters of procedure”).
402
See Judicial Conference Letter, supra note 401, at 2 (stating that “[t]he Judicial Conference has
long opposed direct amendment of the federal rules by legislation rather than through the deliberative
process of the [REA]” because it prefers “the thorough and inclusive procedures of the [REA]”).
403
Advanced Search for Legislation, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
browse?text=h.r.+985#sort=relevance [https://perma.cc/RBH9-57AN] (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
404
See supra text accompanying notes 239–40 (discussing the Supreme Court’s choices in how to
make policy).
405
See, e.g., Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 177 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, C.J., concurring)
(stating that “[u]ntil we revisit this issue as a full Court or it is addressed by the Supreme Court or the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, we will continue to administer the ascertainability requirement in a
way that contravenes the purpose of Rule 23 and, in my view, disserves the public” (emphasis added));
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938 at *1 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (Ambro, C.J.,
dissenting, sur denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (maintaining that the ascertainability issue “merits
. . . review by the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure”).
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1. The Advisory Committee’s Competency to Adopt Procedural Rules
The Advisory Committee has several qualities that make it well suited
to address procedural issues for the federal courts. First, the Advisory
Committee—made up of trial and appellate court judges, practitioners, and
academics406—has subject matter expertise and experience, which many in
Congress lack. The size of the Committee, its composition, and its
deliberative process are likely to enhance the quality and thoughtfulness of
its work product. While the Supreme Court also has subject matter expertise
(and deliberates as a group), the Justices may lack recent or regular litigation
experience in the federal district courts, which many Advisory Committee
members have.407
Second, many members of the Advisory Committee are federal judges
with constitutionally guaranteed job security or law professors with
tenure.408 While other members of the Committee—such as practitioners and
state court judges—may not have as much job security, few members of the
Committee hold elected office or are otherwise susceptible to the types of
political pressure that Congress members routinely face. While this relative
insularity enables the Committee to consider rule amendments neutrally and
without direct pressure from the electorate, the Advisory Committee no
longer operates behind closed doors, as it once did.409 Greater public
participation can be viewed as both a plus and a minus. On the one hand, the
changes wrought by the JIA, including the greater opportunity for public
comment, can put “unwelcome pressure” on the Committee,410 which may
exceed the political pressure faced by the Supreme Court. On the other hand,
the Advisory Committee affords all who might be impacted by a proposed
rule change an opportunity to participate in the process;411 and the resulting
input from the public enables the Committee to consider all points of view
and to anticipate potential unintended consequences of its actions.412
Moreover, the difference in political pressure on the Advisory Committee
and the Court should not be exaggerated as the Court also faces pressure
from interested nonparties in the form of amici curiae briefs, op-ed articles,
and even political protests.

406

See supra note 365.
See Marcus, supra note 30, at 944 (citing the Committee’s “procedural expertise that far outstrips
that of the Court”).
408
Id. at 931.
409
See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
410
Mullenix, Hope Over Experience, supra note 366, at 833 (quoting Reporter, Memorandum to
Civil Rules Committee re Questions About the Rulemaking Process, at 12 (Oct. 18, 1989)).
411
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1208–09; Struve, supra note 365, at 1126.
412
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1208; see also Judicial Conference Letter, supra note
401, at 2 (stating that the amended REA was “designed . . . to produce the best rules possible through
broad public participation and review by the bench, the bar, the academy, and Congress”).
407
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Third, the Advisory Committee can make multiple changes to a single
Rule, or alter several Rules simultaneously, achieving a more
comprehensive solution to a problem than the Court can by adjudicating a
single case before it.413 The Advisory Committee also has greater control
over its agenda as well as the luxury of time. It does not have to wait for a
party to present an issue for its consideration as the Court does; instead, it
can set its own priorities.414 Nor does it have to resolve an issue within a
fixed period of time, whereas the Supreme Court ordinarily labors to decide
cases by the end of the term in which it takes them up.
Finally, the Federal Judicial Center conducts empirical research for the
Advisory Committee,415 which allows the Committee to assess the severity
of problems and the efficacy of potential solutions explored in pilot projects
before adopting proposed rule changes.416 Given these institutional
competencies (and the failure of other governmental actors to resolve the
ascertainability issue), one might have expected the Advisory Committee to
take it up. We turn now to its efforts in that regard.
2. The Advisory Committee’s Consideration of Ascertainability
During its April 2015 meeting, the Advisory Committee cited the issue
of ascertainability as “the biggest topic not [then] on [its Rule 23
Subcommittee’s] list,”417 which it then promptly added to the list.418 In a
Subcommittee conference call held soon thereafter, participants noted a high
“level of interest” in the topic.419 In a series of meetings, conference calls,
and mini-conferences, the Rule 23 Subcommittee debated whether to
propose an amendment to Rule 23 to address the ascertainability issue and,
if so, how. Even as the Subcommittee acknowledged the “growing
importance” of the issue, by November 2015 it had decided not to propose

413
Marcus, supra note 30, at 945; Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1210–11; Struve,
supra note 365, at 1140.
414
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1209 (describing the “greater control over their
own agendas” that rule-makers have, as compared to courts).
415
E.g., Emery G. Lee III, The Timing of Scheduling Orders and Discovery Cut-Off Dates: Report
to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Fed. Jud. Center Oct. 2011); Emery G.
Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Litigation Costs in Civil Cases: Multivariate Analysis, Report to the
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Fed. Jud. Center Mar. 2010); Emery G. Lee III
& Thomas E. Willging, National, Case-Based Civil Rules Survey: Preliminary Report to the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Fed. Jud. Center Oct. 2009).
416
See Judicial Conference Letter, supra note 401, at 2 (stating that the Advisory Committee
“undertake[s] extensive study, including empirical research”); see also Marcus, supra note 30, at 944–45
(describing how empirical data add to the rule-making committees’ advantage); Struve, supra note 365,
at 1140 (explaining that the structure of the rule-making process allows better access to empirical data).
417
NOV. 2015 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 15, at 52.
418
See id. at 286 (describing ascertainability as one of “the two additional topics that have been
added to our list of potential subjects for consideration”).
419
Id. at 281.
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an amendment addressing it for a host of reasons, several of which mirror
the reasons why the Supreme Court declines to grant certiorari even when a
split among the circuits appears.
First, the Subcommittee often mentioned a lack of clarity on the meaning
of ascertainability and uncertainty surrounding even the Third Circuit’s
treatment of the issue.421 Members expressed doubt about Carrera’s import
and the Third Circuit’s efforts to clarify its doctrine in later opinions.422
When one member suggested a modest change to the text of Rule 23 with
an accompanying Advisory Committee Note explaining that Carrera was
rejected, the reporter noted that “that would seem to depend on more
confidence than presently exists about exactly what that approach is.”423
Subcommittee members viewed the issue as “a moving target.”424 The Third
Circuit’s most recent opinion in City Select Auto may reinforce this view.425
Second, in addition to uncertainty about the meaning of ascertainability
and the Third Circuit’s own jurisprudence, the Rule 23 Subcommittee
expressed uncertainty about the existence and extent of a split between the
circuits and the likelihood that the lower federal courts would themselves
work through the doctrinal confusion. In June 2015, before the Seventh
Circuit had rejected Carrera in the Mullins decision, the Rule 23
Subcommittee noted “a clear division among the circuits about how to
address this problem.”426 By September, it had toned down that observation,
doubting whether the lower court decisions were “genuinely inconsistent”427
and citing “assertions that a circuit conflict is developing or has developed,”
even though the Seventh Circuit had by then decided Mullins, flatly rejecting
Carrera.428 Noting the “rapid evolution” in the case law, the Subcommittee
considered whether it would “be best to rely on the evolving jurisprudence
to address these issues rather than attempt a rule change. . . . If the courts are
genuinely split, is there a genuine prospect that the split will be resolved by
judicial decisionmaking?”429 It even held out hope “that the Third Circuit
420

Id. at 89.
Id. at 281; see also id. at 272 (observing that “it is not entirely clear what the Third Circuit’s
actual view is”).
422
See id. at 261 (discussing “the reality that we are somewhat uncertain what the Third Circuit’s
actual take on things is, and later Third Circuit cases have somewhat muddied the waters”); id. at 281
(stating that participants agreed with a comment that the Third Circuit’s “most recent effort . . . to
‘explain’ that doctrine in the Byrd case is almost impossible to follow”).
423
Id. at 283.
424
See id. at 290 (stating that “[t]he most recent Third Circuit decision suggests that court is still
grappling with its ascertainability idea”).
425
See City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 440 (3d Cir. 2017)
(attempting to synthesize the Third Circuit’s approach to ascertainability).
426
NOV. 2015 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 15, at 282 (emphasis added).
427
Id. at 137.
428
Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
429
Id. at 219 (emphasis added); see also id. at 116, 118, 121 (noting that ascertainability was a topic
“on hold” because “[t]he case law . . . appears fluid”); id. at 152 (stating “[t]he consensus was that, for
421
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might look again at its handling of these issues, and might be influenced by
the Seventh Circuit’s Mullins decision.”430 The Advisory Committee cited
the fact that the issue is “percolating in the circuits” as a reason for declining
to act in late 2015.431
Third, while waffling on the existence of a split between the circuits and
expressing hope that the lower federal courts would themselves resolve the
issue, the Subcommittee also occasionally expressed hope that the Supreme
Court would take up the issue. It noted the possibility that the Court would
agree to hear Mullins432 and raised the possibility of Supreme Court review
as a reason for declining to “advance a rule provision” on the issue.433 The
Advisory Committee agreed.434
Fourth, the Subcommittee recognized the “fact-bound nature” of the
analysis,435 analyzing Brecher v. Republic of Argentina436 to demonstrate
important factual differences between that case (involving beneficial
interests in securities issued by the Republic of Argentina) and “ordinary
consumer class actions.”437 Class members’ claims in Brecher were worth
far more than in ordinary consumer cases,438 and the challenges of
identifying those with beneficial interests in the bonds were “qualitatively
different” from the challenges of identifying recipients of gift cards, for
example.439 In the Subcommittee’s view, the complexity and fact-bound
nature of the analysis “suggest[ed] some of the challenges that framing an
ascertainability rule might present.”440

the present, it would be prudent to leave this topic to development in the case law”); id. at 177 (raising
the “key question [of] whether a rule change should be pursued, or alternatively [whether] the committee
should await a consensus in the courts”).
430
Id. at 152 (referring to “the unsettled state of the law”).
431
Draft Minutes of Nov. 5, 2015, Meeting of the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, at 7, in AGENDA
BOOK FOR APRIL 14-15, 2016, MEETING OF ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, at 47, tab 2 [hereinafter
APR. 2016 AGENDA BOOK], http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisorycommittee-rules-civil-procedure-april-2016 [https://perma.cc/ML25-JH46]; id. at 24, in APR. 2016
AGENDA BOOK, supra, at 64.
432
See NOV. 2015 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 15, at 152 (adding that even if certiorari were denied,
“the case law will likely continue to develop. Action by the Advisory Committee now does not seem
likely to produce positive changes”).
433
Id. at 121.
434
See APR. 2016 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 431, at 64 (stating that “[t]here is some prospect that
the Supreme Court may address [the issue] soon”).
435
See NOV. 2015 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 15, at 119.
436
Brecher v. Rep. of Argentina., 806 F.3d 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2015).
437
See NOV. 2015 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 15, at 119 (describing the circumstances in Brecher
as “rather distinctive”).
438
See Brecher, 806 F.3d at 23 (noting that “Argentina defaulted on between $80 and $100 billion
of sovereign debt”).
439
See NOV. 2015 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 15, at 119 (quoting Brecher, 806 F.3d at 25–26).
440
Id.
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Finally, and most interestingly, the Rule 23 Subcommittee occasionally
mentioned “the delicacy and difficulty” of the issue441—by which the
Subcommittee meant far more than the challenges of drafting a rule on an
issue that is deeply intertwined with the facts of each case. The
Subcommittee recognized that
the debate seems to be very merits related. On the one hand,
the concern is that defendants have a right to defend against
fraudulent claims. On the other hand, wholehearted embrace
of the most aggressive versions of ascertainability could doom
consumer class actions, as some judges have noted in
declining to follow what they understand to be the Carrera
view.442
Acknowledging (sometimes obliquely) the “merits related” nature of the
debate,443 the Subcommittee appeared quite averse to entering the fray. It
noted the value in “work[ing] hard to be nonpartisan in drafting. That means
the effort should be to avoid taking a stance that embraces one side or the
other.”444 For example, while noting that Judge Rendell’s concurring
opinion in Byrd was “very thoughtful” and suggesting that Rendell be
invited to the Subcommittee’s upcoming mini-conference, the reporter
cautioned that “we need also to ensure an opportunity to be heard to those
who favor a strong ascertainability requirement.”445 An Appendix
containing sketches for discussion in a meeting asked plaintively, “is there
anything more a rule amendment could do without venturing into the center
of controversy?”446
In defending its decision not to propose an amendment on
ascertainability to the Advisory Committee in November 2015, the
Subcommittee highlighted the sensitivity of the issue, which
touch[es] on very basic principles of class-action
jurisprudence. Any attempt to modify the handling of those
basic principles will likely produce very considerable
controversy. Although that prospect is not an argument
441

Id. at 138. The Rule 23 Subcommittee also cited the “great difficulties” that would accompany
efforts to propose a rule on the issue. Id. at 116.
442
Id. at 282. This concern was reiterated again later in the notes of the call, where the Reporter
stated, “something must assure that class actions cannot be used for legal extortion. It is hard to deny that
this core concern is important. But the way in which it’s been employed in some cases shows that it can
be a very blunt instrument. ‘This is a hard one.’” Id. at 283 (quoting an unnamed participant).
443
Id. at 282. The Subcommittee recognized that requiring receipts to prove purchases of consumer
products “may sometimes be asking too much.” Id. at 218.
444
Id. at 281. Even as this comment was made, it provoked the response that “achieving that goal
may prove very difficult. Almost any resolution of the issues at the heart of the ‘ascertainability’ debate
will appear to take one side or the other.” Id.
445
NOV. 2015 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 15, at 273.
446
Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
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against proceeding with needed rule amendments, it is a reason
for caution about proceeding before the actual state of the law
has become clear enough to make the consequences of
rulemaking relatively predictable.447
Public comments submitted in writing and those made orally at public
hearings and at a teleconference held in conjunction with (other) proposed
amendments to Rule 23 confirm that the issue is contentious, with members
of the defense bar strongly advocating an amendment that would adopt the
strict approach.448
In light of the perceived uncertainty surrounding the Third Circuit’s own
position, the ongoing percolation among the lower courts, the prospect of
Supreme Court intervention, and the diciness of the issue, the Rule 23
Subcommittee recommended placing the ascertainability issue “on hold” in
late 2015,449 a recommendation that the Advisory Committee accepted450
and one that the Subcommittee has reiterated on several subsequent
occasions.451
E. Tentative Conclusions
The lower federal courts, the United States Supreme Court, Congress,
and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules all have had the opportunity to
resolve the important question of ascertainability. The lower courts, which
lack discretion to decline cases within their jurisdiction,452 have attempted
to resolve the issue, but are divided between the traditional and strict
approaches to ascertainability. The Supreme Court, which has significant
discretion over its docket, has declined to grant several petitions for writs of
certiorari in cases raising the issue. The House of Representatives has passed
a bill that would enact the strict approach, but the Senate has not acted upon
447

Id. at 121.
See JUNE 2017 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 203, at 504–06 (summarizing comments).
449
NOV. 2015 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 15, at 89.
450
See APRIL 2016 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 431, at 35 (Chair of Advisory Committee explaining
to the Standing Committee that the Rule 23 Subcommittee continued to place ascertainability on hold
“[b]ecause this issue is currently getting worked out by several circuit courts, is the subject of a few
pending cert petitions to the Supreme Court, and may be affected by the class action cases already argued
this term before the Court”).
451
See, e.g., Draft Minutes of April 14, 2016 Meeting of the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, at 2,
in AGENDA BOOK FOR NOV. 3–4, 2016, MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES [hereinafter
NOV. 2016 AGENDA BOOK], at 56; APRIL 2016 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 431, at 112 (retaining the
ascertainability issue on hold due to a pending petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court and the
pendency of two cases “whose resolution might also bear on these issues”); see also Klonoff, supra note
37, at 1607 (article by member of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules noting that “the Committee has
put the topic of ascertainability on hold and is not moving forward on a possible rule change to address
the subject” (footnote omitted)).
452
See, e.g., Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2156 (2015) (stating that “when a federal court has
jurisdiction, it also has a ‘virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise’ that authority” (alteration in
original) (quoting Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976))).
448
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it. And the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has taken a “wait-and-see”
approach to ascertainability. As the issue continues to percolate within the
lower federal courts, disuniformity prevails, which invites forum shopping
and results in inequitable administration of the laws. While the system can
tolerate disuniformity for a period of time—and in fact may demand it to
ensure sufficient percolation—disuniform interpretations of a Federal Rule
are problematic over the long haul. So what process should be deployed to
resolve the issue?
The Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee, and Congress all have
significant discretion over their respective “agendas,” and the courts of
appeals have discretion to grant or deny en banc review. These actors often
defer to other potential decision-makers, either because they believe the
other body has greater institutional competency or for practical reasons—
they do not want their work to be mooted by the action of another body—
but they typically act with limited information. For example, when a circuit
court is deciding whether or not to hear a case en banc, it does not know
which way the Justices are leaning on a petition for certiorari raising the
same issue; and vice versa. While the Court’s deliberations are confidential,
and it is unlikely that the Court would share its “leanings” regarding
certiorari with circuit court judges, one could imagine other
information-sharing processes that might illuminate and improve allocation
decisions in these circumstances.
The law already provides several opportunities for communication or
signaling between different governmental actors. For example,
28 U.S.C. § 1292 directs district courts to inform the courts of appeals of
their support for an interlocutory appeal on a “controlling question of law as
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.”453 Likewise,
many states have enacted one of the Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Acts, which permit their appellate courts to certify questions of law to
the highest courts of other states and permit their highest courts to answer
questions of law certified to them.454 Many federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, have taken advantage of these certification procedures to
secure authoritative rulings on unresolved questions of state law that will or
may affect their decisions.455
453

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
See, e.g., UNIF. CERTIFIC. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT §§ 2–3, 12 U.L.A. 51 & 53 (1995); UNIF.
CERTIFIC. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT §§ 1–3, 12 U.L.A. 66 & 72 (1967).
455
See, e.g., Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013) (Mem) (granting
certiorari and certifying a question to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S.
207, 212 (1960) (declining to decide a constitutional question before it without first securing an
authoritative ruling on an underlying question of state law); see also Moore, supra note 366, at 1056
(describing a 1991 request by federal judicial rule-makers that Congress enact a statute to fix a drafting
error in a proposed amendment to a Federal Rule that had already been transmitted by the Supreme Court
to Congress).
454
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To facilitate better-informed allocations of authority regarding
procedural issues, Congress could enable the courts of appeals to signal their
support for petitions for writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court or allow the
Court to defer resolution of cases before it and to request that the Advisory
Committee address underlying issues through formal rule-making.456 Such
communication would reduce the delay and guesswork that plague the
current system and its efforts to allocate procedural business.
In the absence of opportunities for this kind of intergovernmental
communication and signaling, the lower courts, the Supreme Court,
Congress, and the Advisory Committee will each unilaterally decide
whether and how to resolve the ascertainability question. We offer several
tentative suggestions here. Regarding the question raised in Part I
above—whether the text of the existing Rule 23 supports the implication of
the strict approach to ascertainability—there is little doubt that the lower
federal courts and the Supreme Court have the greatest institutional
competency.457 They have subject matter expertise and experience in
interpreting federal laws and rules; insulation from political pressure; and
deliberative processes likely to yield accurate results. Indeed, their principal
function in our system of government is interpretation of the laws. A split
among the circuit courts on ascertainability has existed for nearly three years
and at least two of the courts of appeals would have to change their approach
in order to achieve national uniformity. Given the presumption against en
banc review in the circuit courts and the significant costs that such review
imposes, it may take an even longer period of time for two of the courts of
appeals to accept en banc review and reverse their panels’ approach. Rather
than continue to wait for the issue to percolate or for the lower courts to work
things out on their own, the Supreme Court should grant a writ of certiorari
and resolve this interpretative issue soon.
If the Court accepts a case raising ascertainability, it will have to decide
how much discretion it has in interpreting the current text of Rule 23. Judge
456

See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1223 (discussing the text of the Rule and its
history and purpose). A law review article written by Professor Robert Klonoff, a member of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, predicted that the strict approach to ascertainability “will be
repudiated by the Supreme Court or by the Third Circuit itself.” Klonoff, supra note 37, at 1571; see also
id. at 1607 (noting that the Committee has put the topic “on hold” and positing that the “Third Circuit
could reverse itself en banc,” or, if it does not, “the Supreme Court is likely to grant review”). While
explicitly not written on behalf of the Committee, id. at 1569 n.* (noting that the author “writes only in
his personal capacity and not as a member of the Advisory Committee”), the article nevertheless may
serve as a form of informal intergovernmental communication.
457
See, e.g., Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1215 (maintaining that “when the Court
can decide a Rules case using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, efficiency and institutional
advantages weigh in favor of resolution by adjudication”); Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 123, 130 & 136 (2015) (positing that the Court should “use . . . traditional tools of
statutory construction in Rules cases presenting pure questions of law”; describing “what appears to be
a consensus that the Court will treat Rules the same as it does statutes”).
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Karen Nelson Moore (while a professor) argued that the Court may have
even “greater power [and flexibility] to interpret Rules than it does to
interpret statutes” because Congress delegated authority to promulgate the
Rules to the Court.458 Catherine Struve, on the other hand, has argued that
the structure of the delegation of authority to the Court under the REA
suggests that the judiciary “should have, if anything, less latitude to interpret
the Rules than they do to interpret statutes.”459 Eschewing these “formal”
approaches, David Marcus espouses an institutional approach that disavows
“unfettered judicial discretion” in the application of the Rules and counsels
courts “to defer to rulemaker intent and purpose” and “to resist the
temptation to update rules through interpretation.”460
Thus, even if the Supreme Court is best positioned to determine whether
the current text of Rule 23 requires the strict approach (giving due deference
to the Advisory Committee notes),461 that conclusion does not imply that the
Court may, as a matter of policy, impose such a requirement if the current
text does not already do so. Another institution may have greater
institutional competency to address the policy question.
The lower courts seem least institutionally competent to resolve the
policy question, although of course a number of them already have adopted
the strict approach to ascertainability. If the policy issue were a matter for
the judiciary (like the interpretive question is), then the Supreme Court
would be better situated than the courts of appeals to adopt a uniform policy
within a reasonable period of time. But the real question is whether the
Court, Congress, or the Advisory Committee has the greatest institutional
competency to resolve the policy question, assuming as I do that the current
text of Rule 23 does not support the strict approach to ascertainability.462

458
Moore, supra note 366, at 1093; see also id. at 1040, 1085, 1092 (arguing that the “Supreme
Court should take a more activist role in interpreting the Federal Rules by including an analysis of
purpose and policy,” and maintaining that the “Court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules does not
involve the same separation of powers issues inherent in cases involving normal statutory construction,
because the Court is interpreting rules Congress empowered it to create, not statutes created by a coequal
branch”).
459
Struve, supra note 365, at 1120 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1102 (arguing that “Congress’s
delegation of rulemaking authority should constrain, rather than liberate, courts’ interpretation of the
Rules”). See generally supra Parts III.C & III.D.
460
Marcus, supra note 30, at 930, 940.
461
See Struve, supra note 365, at 1103 (drawing upon the Court’s deference to “agency
interpretations of legislative rules” and concluding that “the Court should accord the [Advisory
Committee] Notes authoritative effect”); id. at 1141–42 (advocating an interpretive approach “that gives
authoritative weight to the Advisory Committee Notes”); id. at 1152 (discussing the Notes’ “distinctive
claims to authority”); see also Marcus, supra note 30, at 965–66 (citing Advisory Committee Notes as
“[f]irst tier materials” and the Committee’s reports to the Standing Committee as “[s]econd-tier
materials”).
462
See supra Part I.B.
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While the Supreme Court sometimes concedes that changes to the Rules
should be made through the rule-making process authorized by the REA,463
at other times the Court itself essentially amends the Rules by interpreting
them to achieve policy ends.464 For example, scholars widely agree that the
Court in Twombly and Iqbal went far beyond interpreting the text of Rule 8,
instead making a policy judgment about access to the courts and the risks of
abusive litigation.465 When the Court operates in this way—engaging in
what Elizabeth Porter calls its “managerial mode”—the Court “is
strategizing and innovating to achieve normative goals” and using
“adjudication to re-set the rulemaking agenda.”466
Neither the Court nor the academy has developed a single consistent
theory for distinguishing between those Rules-related issues within the
Court’s adjudicatory authority and those on which the Court should defer to
the Advisory Committee.467 Some scholars writing in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, who were frustrated by the Court’s emphasis on textualism in
463
See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 224 (2007) (reiterating that “adopting different and more
onerous pleading rules to deal with particular categories of cases should be done through established
rulemaking procedures, and not on a case-by-case basis by the courts”); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (maintaining that “a [pleading] requirement of greater specificity for particular
claims is a result that ‘must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation’” (citation omitted)); see also Porter, supra note 457, at 125–26 (using the phrase
“‘statutory’ mode of Rules interpretation” to refer to the Court’s practice of “disclaim[ing] its power to
influence the Rules” and requiring “that changes to the Rules must come through the rulemaking process
and not through judicial adjudication” (footnote omitted)); Marcus, supra note 30, at 968 (positing that
the Court ordinarily follows a “‘rulemaker primacy’ canon,” under which “significant changes to the
procedural status quo come only from the rulemaking process”).
464
See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (stating that, “[p]robably,
then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can
hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in [questionable] cases”; expressing concern
for the high cost of discovery, rather than relying on the text of the Rule or an Advisory Committee Note).
465
See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 30, at 972 (maintaining that the Court “illegitimately refashioned
rule text” in Twombly and Iqbal); Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1196 (maintaining that
“commentators almost universally recognized Twombly and Iqbal as statements regarding the policy
underlying pleading requirements . . . not the legalistic interpretation of Rule 8”); see also Richard D.
Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 449 (2013)
(citing Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60
DUKE L.J. 597, 652–53 (2010)) (noting that some lament that “the Supreme Court engages in amendment
by case law instead of through the REA process”); Porter, supra note 457, at 127, 138–39 (identifying
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) and Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) as
additional “infamous” cases illustrating the Court’s managerial mode).
466
Porter, supra note 457, at 137; see also id. at 126 (describing the Court’s “managerial mode,” in
which it “eschews the tools of statutory interpretation in favor of the hallmark rhetorical techniques of
common-law decision-making”).
467
See, e.g., id. at 148–53 (describing various scholars’ “sharply different visions” of the Court’s
role and responsibility regarding the Federal Rules); see also Marcus, supra note 30, at 928 (offering an
“institutional” approach to Rule interpretation); Moore, supra note 366, at 1040 (advocating that the
Supreme Court “take a more activist role in interpreting the Federal Rules by including an analysis of
purpose and policy”); Struve, supra note 365, at 1102 (“Congress’s delegation of rulemaking authority
should constrain, rather than liberate, courts’ interpretation of the Rules.”).
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interpreting the Rules, maintained that the Court has “greater power to
interpret Rules than it does to interpret statutes,” given its ultimate
responsibility under the REA to promulgate the Rules.468 More recently,
however, in light of the 1988 amendments to the REA469 and the Court’s
apparent willingness to adopt its own policy preferences regardless of the
language of the Rules, other scholars have maintained that the Court should
defer to the rule-making process,470 or at least to the rule-makers’ intent and
purpose.471 Professors Lumen Mulligan and Glen Staszewski have
analogized the Supreme Court to an administrative agency, arguing that like
other agencies, the Court may set policy through adjudication or through a
notice-and-comment rule-making process.472 But Mulligan and Staszewski
posit that the Supreme Court should presumptively adopt procedural policy
through rule-making, and use adjudication only where “legal issues can be
resolved through traditional tools of statutory interpretation.”473 Professor
Struve, who quarrels with the agency analogy,474 maintains that the terms of
Congress’s delegation of rule-making authority to the Court “constrain any
subsequent interpretation of the Rules” and require “alterations to the Rules
[to] undergo the process specified in the Enabling Act, rather than taking
effect through judicial fiat in the course of litigation.”475 Other scholars, such
as Robert Bone and David Marcus, who challenge the agency analogy,476
468
Moore, supra note 366, at 1093; Porter, supra note 457, at 148; see also Joseph P. Bauer,
Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme Court’s Role as Interpreter of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720, 727 (1988) (describing the Court’s role in
promulgating the Rules).
469
See supra notes 364–69 and accompanying text.
470
See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 30, at 946–47 (discussing deliberative democracy in the rulemaking process and its effect on the Court’s application of Federal Rules); Mulligan & Staszewski, supra
note 240, at 1190 (“[P]roposing that the Court create a presumption in favor of rulemaking over
adjudication . . . .”); Struve, supra note 365, at 1102 (“Rules should undergo the process specified in the
Enabling Act, rather than taking effect through judicial fiat . . . .”). Of course, the Court itself has a role
in the rule-making process, but its precise nature is difficult to ascertain as its “deliberations on proposed
rule changes are secret.” Moore, supra note 366, at 1064. Moore posited that the Court’s role is
“essentially supervisory, with the Court only occasionally exercising a veto over submissions from the
Judicial Conference.” Id. at 1065 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 1068–71 (describing the Justices’
view of the Court’s role in the rule-making process as “limited” and in the nature of a “conduit”).
471
Marcus, supra note 30, at 929, 940.
472
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1190.
473
Id. at 1206, 1213.
474
Struve, supra note 365, at 1125 (noting that the REA “somewhat resembles statutes that delegate
rulemaking authority to agencies,” but recognizing that the REA delegates authority to a “less politically
accountable branch”).
475
Id. at 1102; see also id. at 1130 (noting that the REA “conditions the delegation of rulemaking
power on the Court’s use of the prescribed procedures”).
476
See Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 907–08 (rejecting the analogy between courts and
administrative agencies because agencies are empowered by Congress to make substantive law, while
the Court is not, and agencies are subject to political checks and balances through Congressional and
executive branch oversight, while the end product of the REA process will rarely be vetoed by Congress);
Marcus, supra note 30, at 942–43 (noting that practically speaking, “the Court does not ‘forge’ the
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also support a “centralized, court-based, and committee-centered
rulemaking process.”477
The Advisory Committee not only has subject matter expertise and
access to empirical data, but it solicits and responds to input from the public,
engaging in a more transparent, participatory, and politically accountable
process than adjudication.478 The Committee has greater control over its
agenda and the opportunity to craft a more comprehensive solution to
procedural problems than the Supreme Court, which may adjudicate only
the case or controversy before it.479 And the Committee’s work
product—the Federal Rules—is more visible, better organized, and easier to
find than rules announced in judicial decisions.480 While Congress, like the
Committee, has access to empirical data and even greater, direct political
accountability,481 it is more likely to respond to interest group pressures and
engage in inefficient “logrolling” than the judge-heavy Advisory
Committee.482 Thus, we recommend that the Advisory Committee take up
the ascertainability issue and, for the reasons described in Part II, incorporate
the traditional approach and explicitly reject the strict approach to
ascertainability.

Federal Rules” itself, but merely acts as a “conduit,” as the Rules are “the product of others,” not the
Court).
477
Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 933; see also Marcus, supra note 30, at 944, 957
(maintaining that the Court’s interpretation of the Rules should “reflect rulemakers’ decisions” because
of “their superior procedural competence,” and advocating an interpretive method that “inquire[s] into
rulemaker intent and purpose”).
478
See, e.g., Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1209 (describing the “participatory and
transparency advantages” of the rule-making process); Struve, supra note 365, at 1136–37 (describing
the involvement of practitioners and others in the rule-making process).
479
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1209–10; see also Marcus, supra note 30, at 968
(recognizing that the “rulemakers designed the Federal Rules as an interconnected system”); Struve,
supra note 365, at 1123 (describing a balance achieved by the Advisory Committee in the 1993
amendment to Rule 11).
480
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 240, at 1211 (attributing these characteristics to agency
regulations in general).
481
See, e.g., Redish & Amuluru, supra note 361, at 1326–27 (considering a larger role for Congress
because procedural rules are political: “[T]hey may substantially affect the lives of the citizenry and
implicate fundamental ideological choices about loss allocation and resource redistribution”).
482
See Bone, The Process, supra note 348, at 922–25 (describing the “typical logrolling scenario”
as “a deal between two legislators, each eager for the other to support a project that benefits politically
powerful constituents,” and considering “vigorous logrolling” unlikely in the Advisory Committee
because the rule-makers are not “strongly allied with distinct constituencies”).

